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Abstract
This thesis research explores integrating a reputation-based trust mechanism with an
agent-based backup protection system to improve the performance of traditional backup
relay methods that are currently in use in power transmission systems. Integrating agent
technology into relay protection schemes has been previously proposed to clear faults
more rapidly and to add precision by enabling the use of adaptive protection methods. A
distributed, cooperative trust system such as that used in peer-to-peer file sharing
networks has the potential to add an additional layer of defense in a protection system
designed to operate with greater autonomy. This trust component enables agents in the
system to make assessments using additional, behavioral-based analysis of cooperating
protection agents. Simulation results illustrate the improved decision-making capability
achieved by incorporating this cooperative trust method when experiencing abnormal or
malicious communications. The integration of this additional trust component provides
an added push for implementing the proposed agent-based protection schemes to help
mitigate the impact from wide-area disturbances and the cascading blackouts that often
follow. As the push for electric grid modernization continues, an agent-based trust
system including this type of behavioral-based analysis will also benefit other smart
components connecting critical grid control and monitoring information systems.
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REPUTATION-BASED TRUST FOR A COOPERATIVE, AGENT-BASED
BACKUP PROTECTION SCHEME FOR POWER NETWORKS

I. Introduction

R

ESEARCH into the improvement of protective relays used for the protection of
electrical power transmission and distribution systems has further increased

following findings released after the investigations into the August 2003 blackout
affecting the Northeastern United States and Canada. The instability resulting from
cascading outages was identified as a primary cause of the uncontrolled blackout
spreading across a wide geographic area [59]. This research has been ongoing since the
mid-1980’s when the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)
sponsored a study indicating that protective relays were involved in 75 percent of major
power system interruptions [48].

The importance of proper protection settings is

amplified during times of system disturbance.
1.1 Background
Many problems involving relay failures are not exposed until external fault
conditions occur or the system is operating at or near its limits. As part of the Energy
Independence and Security Act of 2007, grid modernization was directed to ensure that
electricity could be reliably and securely provided to meet future growth requirements
[1]. While grid interconnections have become a standard method of ensuring redundant
paths between power sources and load destinations in a grid, these modernization efforts
are looking at better integration of communications networks to provide increased control
1

opportunities. As a result, the electric grid is becoming more unified which may intensify
cascading problems that result when a relay causes a trip at an undesired time.
Improved network capabilities have enabled grid modernization efforts. Utility
companies are able to gather more information, quicker than ever before. Utilizing more
readily available commercial off the shelf (COTS) products has changed the industry
from revolving around proprietary technology to integrating more open communications
standards [55]. Increased information has helped improve the situational awareness of
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system operators and enabled industry
to base business decisions around real-time data. However, this integration has also
opened the system to remotely executed computer-based network attacks.
Power and other utility networks are increasingly the subject of attack [19], [20],
[22], and [56]. Threats to the power grid and other elements of critical infrastructure are
likely to occur at times of war preparation such as during the mobilization and
deployment phases [44] to cause delays and backlogs at key logistics locations [16] and
[31]. Other research [63] focused specifically on attack strategies designed to amplify the
cascading effects of grid failures. Improving the reliability and security of the grid
protection elements and the underlying communications networks will have a direct
impact on the ability of the US armed forces to continue to deploy and rapidly project
force where needed anywhere around the globe.
1.2 Overview and Goals
Transmission line protection systems are particularly vulnerable to these types of
cyber attacks. The physical and network protection in place is insufficient given their
2

capability to control switch gear and the flow of electricity [55]. As modernization
increases there has been a larger focus on improving the security of control networks.
This thesis introduces a reputation-based trust mechanism to help supplement more
traditional network protection mechanisms and will augment the layered security
approaches as recommended in [14]. The research goal will also enable system operators
to gather more insight into the behavior of essential control components using both
operational and nonoperational data.
Public standards such as IEC 61850 and the transition to internet technology have
increased interoperability but also made the power networks more vulnerable to attack.
A peer-to-peer (P2P) based trust scheme will enhance the effectiveness of the other
network protection mechanisms such as intrusion detection systems and firewalls. This
thesis shows that cooperative information sharing produces improved decision-making
capability through coordinated fault verification to reduce grid area isolation and enables
more responsive breaker reactions to system faults when compared to traditional fault
clearing mechanisms. As this type of trust system is refined, it can be of extreme
importance, adding reliability and security to a utility network, especially if integrated
into a segregated Utility Intranet [14].
1.3 Organization
The following chapters discuss agent-based technology and its applications in
transmission network protection as well as cooperative trust arrangements in peer-to-peer
systems. Chapter II covers established research in the areas of the power grid, traditional
and proposed protection mechanisms, cooperative trust systems, and potential threats to
3

grid security. Chapter III details the methodology used for assessing the ability of an
agent-based cooperative trust protection mechanism. This mechanism must recognize
behavior that might cause incorrect or unreliable decision making and react appropriately,
producing correct results more rapidly than traditional backup protection mechanisms.
Chapter IV gives an analysis of why important features were included in the trust scheme
and provides the experimental results from simulated scenarios. Finally, Chapter V
summarizes this thesis work and its contributions and suggests future research
opportunities in this area.

4

II. Literature Review
he power grid is just one element of a nation’s critical infrastructure, however

T

many of the other elements essential to support society depend upon a reliable

flow of power to function. A relatively new invention in the history of humanity, people
have quickly come to rely on the electrical energy produced and transported by the power
grid on a daily basis. This lucrative and indispensable industry has recently become a
more commonly suggested target for both physical and cyber attack due to society’s
dependence on it. Attacks on the system are likely to be the work of professionals,
accomplished by organized crime and state-sponsored terrorist or military groups [18].
Environmental problems also afflict this complex system and previous research
efforts typically focused on improving system stability, security, and reliability with
respect to these types of issues. Power system companies are integrating more networked
communications into their corporate and control systems because it provides them with
additional information to make better business and system control decisions and has
become economical to do so. As the strain on existing grid systems continues to increase
and more attention is given to network based attacks on the system, some research efforts
have shifted to the cyber security needs of power systems typically revolving around
identity credentials and policy-based trust as discussed in [5].
Real-time information requirements have presented some difficulties in fully
utilizing the security benefits that these trust systems offer, warranting further study into
other layered protection mechanisms. Additionally, modernization will increase network
reliance, necessitating this investigation into using reputation-based trust to improve
5

system coordination. This chapter on related literature is broken into four main parts.
The first describes the electrical grid and gives some insight into why interest in its
security is increasing. The second part describes current grid protections mechanisms
and research efforts to transition to a more decentralized networked protection
environment. The third section reviews the use of trust as a measure of communications
reliability and how collaborative trust has been applied in existing peer-to-peer networks.
The final section covers the increased need for cyber security in SCADA systems.
2.1 Background on the Power Grid
Electric power has been generated commercially since the late 1800’s and has
constantly been under a state of expansion and interconnection. The three primary
reasons for this expansion as stated in [40] include benefits from economies of scale,
improved load factor and increased generation reserves. Together, these three factors
have helped make electricity more affordable and reliable for a greater number of people.
A basic understanding of electricity, the main components in a power grid and a history
of system vulnerabilities is essential to understanding the current requirement for
modernization.
2.1.1 Electricity, the Fundamentals
There are four basic descriptors used when discussing electricity in power
systems [40]. The first term is voltage. Voltage (V) refers to the difference in electric
potential and can be expressed as one Joule of energy that is needed to move one
Coulomb of electrical charge. Differences in electric potential cause charge to flow

6

through a line. The second descriptor current (I) describes the rate of this flow and is
measured in amperes in which one ampere is one Coulomb per second. These two terms
are often referred to together when using Ohm’s Law given as
V

IR

(2.1)

where V is the voltage, I is the current, and R is the resistance (the third term).
Resistance is determined by the characteristics of the material through which the current
flows and is measured in ohms. Increasing resistance in series (longer transmission lines)
increases the overall resistance where as increasing in parallel (increased aggregate load)
decreases the overall resistance [40]. Thus there is a linear relationship between voltage
and current that depends upon the resistance. For a given voltage, if the resistance
decreases the current should increase. This is particularly evident in ground shorts where
an excessive current typically engages protection mechanisms to isolate the fault and
prevent circuit damage.
The potential for transmission line damage can be explained by resistive heating
as discussed in [40]. Heat is measured in energy per unit time as is referred to as power
(P), our fourth term. Power is most often generally referred to by the equation
P

IV

(2.2)

which describes power as current multiplied by voltage and results in a measure of watts
or Joules per second. Using Ohm’s Law, this equation 2.2 may also be rewritten as
P

I 2R

to more clearly show the relationship between current, resistance, and power.
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(2.3)

This relationship is significant when discussing changes that occur in different
parts of the systems. As a rule, current and resistance cannot be adjusted independently
[40]. This relationship can come into play in two distinct types of scenarios. First, in
some circumstances such as in home usage, voltage is held constant. Decreasing circuit
resistance causes current to increase and since the current term is squared, current has
more of an impact on the power than the resistance. In the second scenario more
applicable to transmission and distribution line design, current is held constant with
respect to the power lines and is dependent upon the aggregate end loads. Since power
losses from resistive heating are not desired, line resistance should ideally be minimized.
The selection of a conductor for use as a line material is important since tradeoffs exist
between performance and cost. This selection must account for topography as well. As
the power supply is increased during times of peak demand, current across the line
increases, resulting in additional line heating. This resistive heating can result in line sag
that is associated with a primary cause of short circuits and their resultant power outages.
The four terms previously discussed do not encompass all power system
descriptors require for system protection. There are additional characteristics associated
with alternating current (AC) that need explanation. AC was selected for use in power
systems due to the ease of using transformers to raise and lower voltages, optimizing
energy conservation. Higher voltages prevented transmission losses, but lower voltages
were needed for safer end-use applications. AC is traditionally depicted as a sine wave.
The current reverses direction twice each cycle at a frequency that has been standardized
at 60 cycles per second in the US.
8

The two most significant characteristics associated with AC systems are reactance
(X) and impedance (Z). Reactance is associated with the ability to oppose the current
flow and is either classified as inductive if it resists changes in current or capacitive if it
resists changes in voltage. If there is any reactance, there will be a phase shift between
the voltage and the current sine waves.

This reactance measure is combined with

resistance to create a measure called impedance. Impedance deals with the aggregated
resistance or desire to flow and may be represented in complex number notation. These
two terms are used by protection mechanisms to determine fault conditions and location.
2.1.2 Main Power Grid Components
When analyzing the state of a power grid and its ability to balance power
requirements, researchers typically divide the grid into segments based on function. The
electric power grid is comprised of four major components (as seen in Figure 1) that
work in harmony to deliver a consistent supply of power exactly when and where it is
needed. The first part of the power grid is the generation capability. The source of
power used in generation can come from many different resources, typically

Figure 1.

Basic depiction of typical electric grid components as described in [59]
9

acknowledged as coal, oil, or nuclear but now includes more green options such as wind
and solar energy. Regardless of the actual physical source, generation is involved with
transforming that resource into electrical power. Once in this form, it is able to be
transformed (typically to a higher voltage) and transported to other regions.
Now that the electrical voltage has been generated, it flows to other locations in
the grid on the transmission system. The transmission system is characterized by highvoltage transmission lines generally recognized by tall steel towers.

It is used for

transporting electricity over long distances using higher voltages to reduce line heating
and resistive power losses as discussed in the previous section.
Transmission systems connect geographically separated regions that may not have
their own generation capability or need additional generation capabilities. The US power
grid is broken into three regions (as seen in Figure 2), each with its own generating and

Figure 2.

Three interconnections of North American power grid as described in [58]
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transmission capabilities. There are limited DC connections between these regions, but
they are typically thought of as isolated grids among themselves. As explained by NERC
in [45], together the generation and transmission components comprise the bulk power
system. Bulk power is suitable for general purpose electrical operations, but additional
conditioning is more likely needed for sensitive operations.
The transmission systems in each grid are then linked to distribution systems at
power substations. The voltage is gradually stepped down to lower voltages that are
generally considered safer and are more suitable for final customer use before being
distributed to end users.

These distribution systems generally cover a smaller

geographical region and may have been isolated from other regions at one time.
Distribution systems cover the final portion of the journey from generation source to load
destination.
The final component in the electrical grid is the load or power demand.
Individual loads are important for customers and billing components of power supply
companies, however for planning purposes these individual loads are aggregated in terms
of quantity and timing. Individual loads are very dynamic, changing in both predictable
and unpredictable cycles. Planners are able to use these historical cycles along with
current environmental and social data to try to balance generation to meet the required
loads across the system (both typical and unexpected). As loads increase, there is an
increased likelihood of system overload if generating stations do not keep up with the
growing demand. The electricity generated for the power grid must be used almost
immediately after it is produced. It cannot be stored or routed as easily as other utilities
11

such as water, sewage or gas. Electricity must be carefully monitored and controlled
ensuring that the power generated meets the required loads.
2.1.3 Monitoring and Control Systems
Information systems that provide monitoring and control functions are the lifeline
of the power industry. They allow for responses necessary to provide the reliability and
stability required to create an uninterrupted flow of power. The power industry has made
progress on modernizing its monitoring and control systems to improve performance and
awareness of system status.
companies’ self interest.

This progress has usually been done for the utility

Companies are able to capitalize on the interconnections

between regions, trading power production capabilities to balance the overall system in
the most cost-effective manner. They are able to get feedback from the components in
the system enabling more rapid reactions to periods of increased demand.
Monitoring and control functions are provided by SCADA system components
inserted throughout the grid. SCADA systems generally provide centralized control and
monitoring for a wide geographic region. Devices read system data, automatically react
to adverse conditions using protection devices and then typically report back to a system
operator monitoring the overall system. This operator can also make inputs to the system
by adjusting or overriding automatic controls based on more complete situational
knowledge. These computer systems aggregate data to help build a complete picture of
the system and improve situational awareness for operations personnel.
The influential ability created by advanced control systems and recent integration
of open communications systems such as the internet has made SCADA systems an
12

attractive target for cyber attacks [47]. The US government has focused attention on
securing the components of its critical infrastructure against cyber and physical attacks in
a series of publications between 1998 and 2010 that included presidential directives such
as [9], [10], and [13] as well as planning documents [1] and [12].
2.2 Protecting the Electrical Grid
Improving the reliability of electrical flow has often focused on improving the
performance and security of power grid protection components. One branch of research
has focused on the improving communications networks and cyber-security. Connection
points between the utility networks and the rest of the internet can be secured using
traditional mechanisms such as firewalls, intrusion detection devices and cryptographic
protocols [25]. This type of research has received a lot of attention as the government
revealed evidence of foreign attempts at network mapping [19] and as cybercrime
organizations threaten to breach network security from around the globe [62].
An alternate focus on grid protection has revolved around increasing system
stability by improving fault clearing methods. Fault clearing time is defined in [3] as the
time necessary to identify a fault condition, make a decision about whether or not to take
an action, and take the action to help isolate a section of the grid. While there are many
components that help provide this function, fault clearing is primarily dependent upon
circuit breakers that physically open or close a circuit and the protective relays that help
determine when a circuit breaker should operate and direct that operation [40]. This
branch of research primarily looks at improving the interactions of physical devices such
as circuit breakers and relays and the capability to provide human operators with
13

additional system knowledge or improved interfaces to make better decisions. Research
done in conjunction with this thesis has been accomplished with respect to this second
focus on protection.
2.2.1 Circuit Breakers
Circuit breakers open and close a circuit based on input from another device and
rely on a form of energy to open and/or close. When the breaker is closed, current is able
to flow through the circuit. When the breaker is opened, the flow of current is interrupted
until the breaker is reclosed. Breakers can be designed for different functions taking
advantage of various mediums and their associated characteristics to terminate the
electric flow. The commands to open or close the breaker can be directed by a system
operator in response to stability needs or may be generated by an automated monitoring
device known as a protective relay in response to a fault condition.
2.2.2 Transmission-Line Relay Protection
A relay is the device that detects abnormal power conditions and signals a circuit
breaker to interrupt the current [24]. There are a variety of relay types used in the power
grid, each with a purpose specific to the protection needed. Transmission lines are
typically provided redundant protection and protection is needed from phase faults (faults
between transmission lines) and ground faults (faults between a transmission line and a
point of zero potential such as the ground or a tree) [40]. The distance relay and the
differential relay as described in [24] and [53] provide the bulk of the protection from
these types of faults for the transmission system.

14

Distance protection relays use impedance measurements (as discussed in Section
2.1.1) to determine if a fault is located within their protection zone. The impedance of a
transmission line is generally well known [24] and tested to verify reliable and expected
performance.

Impedance is dependent upon the line material and construction.

Impedance should stay consistent along the length of the line as long as the line type is
the same allowing the location of the fault to be determined with a relatively high degree
of accuracy. If the impedance measurement falls into the fault zone that was established
by system designers based on grid components and architecture, the relay will trigger the
appropriate circuit breakers to open. The research in this thesis focuses on this common
type of transmission line protection.
A second type of protection mechanism is often integrated into a protection
scheme to detect other types of faults. Differential protection is increasingly being used
with relay communications methods such as pilot wire relaying to measure the difference
in current at both ends of a transmission line. Relays at each end of the line send and
receive measurements from the opposite end of the line they are protecting. Since the
difference between measurements should be zero, the appropriate circuit breakers are
tripped if the magnitude of difference is above a set value.
2.2.3 Fault Clearing Using Circuit Breakers and Protective Relays
Power circuit breakers and protective relays work in conjunction to provide
autonomous monitoring and control functions necessary to clear fault conditions in power
systems by interrupting the flow of power to a portion of the circuit [40]. Efforts to
improve the operation of these devices have been ongoing since the 1950’s when
15

Kimbark described conditions required to rapidly clear faults from the power system
[30].

More rapid fault clearing has a stabilizing effect by reducing the loss of

synchronization and limiting the associated transient fluctuations.
While faster fault clearing is essential, it is only one component of improving the
system reliability. Proper analysis of fault location and system conditions are just as
vital.

This analysis enables the protective devices to clear the fault in a way that

minimizes the effects caused when isolating a portion of the grid. Relays must be
sensitive and intelligent enough to select only the circuit breakers that need to open to
clear the fault.

If too many circuit breakers are open (or if the area they cover

encompasses too large a region) more loads will be disconnected from the generation
devices. It is typically better to take additional time to perform more complete analysis
and open only the appropriate breakers than it is to open selected breakers as rapidly as
possible.
In order to gather the appropriate information necessary for this analysis, different
types of protective relays have been installed in the electrical grid. These different types
help increase the selectivity of a relay. Relay implementations as discussed in [36] have
been integrated into different regions of the power grid accounting for what they are
protecting and the type of protection that is required.

Generators require different

safeguard mechanisms and settings than transmission lines do. Backup systems require
different settings than primary systems. As the grid has been interconnected, improper
settings have had a bigger impact and amplified the results of improper protection
settings [59].
16

2.2.4 Interest in Relay Improvement from 2003 US Blackout
The impact that improper relay settings can have on a system were brought to
light from the findings following the August 2003 blackout affecting regions of the
northeastern United States and portions of Canada [59]. Mismanaged relay settings were
directly related to the cascading effects that caused the blackout to cover such a wide
region. The relays did not fail but operated as designed and intended according to their
improper implementations.

Had system operators been able to mitigate one of the

primary causes of the disturbance through better situational awareness, it is likely the
cascade would not have occurred. Better relay coordination may be able to prevent
cascading effects in the future.
After several lines isolated regions of the grid due to ground faults from contact
with overgrown trees, the relay responsible for the cascade reacted to an overload
situation as opposed to an actual ground fault [59]. The generation losses from the
isolation coupled with the operator’s failure to reduce the overall load caused the relay’s
power information readings to fall in the impedance zone. The relay read the conditions
as if it was experiencing a three-phase fault instead of an overload and its backup
protection tripped the appropriate circuit breaker as it was designed to according to its
settings.
The findings released in that study recommended reviewing relay settings. Many
relays had been improperly configured or manufacturer preset configurations had not
been adjusted for the current implementation and topography.

In particular, the

committee acknowledged backup relays should normally be configured to check for
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phase problems or fault conditions as opposed to overloads. Overloads can often be
short-term problems that occur as a system adjusts to fluctuations. By triggering an
improper circuit breaker trip in a situation such as this, these relays may spread the
outage that they were attempting to contain.
Additional interest in relay improvement was generated by two cascading
blackouts that occurred in the European Union [60] and [61]. The 2003 blackout in Italy
and the 2006 blackout originating in Germany both resulted in part from N-1 criteria not
being met and from a lack of coordination with neighboring regions after multiple line
trips caused power imbalances between the now isolated regions [60] and [61]. The N-1
security rule as defined in [60] refers to the ability of a system to continue operations
even if a single incident such as loss of a generation facility or transmission line occurs.
It is aimed at preventing cascading effects.

Ultimately in both situations, those

conditions were not met. Findings indicated that better unified protection was needed for
these increasingly interdependent systems and that relays operated incorrectly 15% of the
time in the Italian blackout [60].

Increased relay research can help improve the

coordination of protection efforts and improve system stability.
2.2.5 Existing Relay Implementations in Backup Protection
Currently, backup protection systems have been integrated into relay protection
schemes to provide redundancy should the primary protection fail to operate. Primary
(zone 1) protection typically protects the first 85% of the line connected to a relay while
backup (zone 3) systems cover a larger area [53]. Zone 2 protection can also be used to
cover an area that encompasses the entire first line and a portion of the adjacent line [24].
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Figure 3. Transmission Line Relay Protection Zones. Primary protection is provided by
zone 1 coverage which protects approximately 85% of primary line while
zone 3 coverage covers the primary line, and extends past 100% of adjacent
line to provide backup protection for that line. For example Relay 3 provides
zone 1 coverage for line B and zone 3 coverage for line C. Relay 4 would
also provide zone 1 coverage for line B but zone 3 coverage for line A instead
since it is directional. Relay 1 and relay 6 would provide zone 3 coverage for
line B. A zone 2 protection scheme (not shown) would extend past the zone 1
coverage, but would be less than zone 3 coverage area. [53]
Zone 3 systems provide multi-line protection, including the line that a relay is directly
connected to as well as lines protected by adjacent neighbors [53]. As described in [59],
some operators have stopped using zone 3 relays on high-voltage lines and reset zone 2
relays to serve the purpose of a zone 3 relay. For this research, zone 1 and zone 3
protection regions were included as part of the protection scheme while the zone 2 region
was not based on the coverage area. These protection zones can be seen in Figure 3.
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When a fault occurs, the fault location and actions taken by other relays will determine if
a relay needs to take action. Using direct communications between relays to coordinate
circuit breaker opening at both ends of a transmission line as in pilot schemes [7],
designers are able to create a more effective protection scheme.
This electrical fault protection has increased in importance as current systems are
stressed to their limits [58]. Transmission line protection mechanisms are of crucial
importance to the protection of the entire grid. Designers must give proper consideration
to relay settings when creating primary and backup protection schemes. Both the line
length and its relative importance in connecting geographically dispersed generating
locations with destination loads determine the characteristics required for planning proper
operation of the protection systems. Benefits of using schemes with increased relay
coordination such as pilot schemes must be weighed against the decreasing costs of these
more resource intensive systems.
2.2.6 Proposed Agent-based Backup Protection for Transmission Lines
As costs for more advanced communications networks continues to decline,
researchers have proposed replacing traditional protective relays with relay Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IED) [64] that provide increased protective capabilities. In this
research, an agent was defined to be a software component able to interact and act
autonomously based on the results of its interactions. The IED’s that were created would
be able to read power system information and react to that information. They would also
share information with neighboring nodes to include passing along any protective actions
that they have taken.
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This agent-based approach would fit into the current monitoring and control
scheme and could pass information to a master control center as well. It would allow
agents to use remotely acquired information to make more correct decisions locally.
Preliminary research as shown in [64] has demonstrated that this agent-based protection
scheme has the ability to clear electrical ground fault conditions more rapidly, while still
allowing the system to analyze the complete set of information required when making
protection decisions. The agents work together cooperatively as described in [14] to
provide protection according to a preauthorized set of rules.
2.2.7 Current Wide Area Agent Implementations in the Power System
The additional computing power provided by integrating intelligent agents in a
system such as this is of additional benefit in a SCADA scheme when compared to
traditional relay implementations. Agent-based relay research has also been initiated for
adaptive relay schemes. These schemes provide protection that changes with the external
environment based on feedback from other parts of the system.
New power systems in China have already been incorporating agents to provide
features such as this as described in [11] and [70]. These agent implementations enable
communications between relays and central servers. The agents assist in fault protection
using additional data gathered through collaboration.

This increased information

requirement entails more inter-device communications, necessitating additional methods
to secure the information exchanges. This security is likely to come through network
protection mechanisms such as cryptography and firewalls as well as other tools
described in [6].
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2.3 Increased Need For Cyber Security and Better Information Sharing
2.3.1 SCADA Modernization Efforts and Security Impacts
Since the mid 1990’s, the evolution and modernization of electrical grid control
mechanisms have attracted attention in the cyber security community. Computer-based
control systems were introduced to provide more advanced computational power and
better data processing. Digital technologies resulted in improved information handling
and provided operators with automated, coordinated options to aid their decision-making
abilities. Systems typically revolved around a centralized computer located in a control
center that would communicate with remote system components over a wide area
network. The resulting systems are much more capable and interoperable, but have also
made the systems more vulnerable to exploitation from malware, hackers, and cyber
attack [55].
Modernization is necessary for improved grid stability and information sharing.
The increased situational awareness enables operators to create flexible response options
to prevent outages and minimize disruptions. The additional protection requirements
when integrating interoperable components are likely to increase security and reliability
of the system as a whole. The previous practice of security by obscurity goes against
Kerchkhoff’s principle that states that the system design should not require secrecy to
function securely [29]. Believing proprietary technology is a security measure works
only until the specifications are discovered. Once discovered, the system becomes more
vulnerable and can be exploited more easily, often without notice.
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2.3.2 Communication Needs for Grid Modernization
Security needs continue to increase as the interdependence of the electric grid and
communications systems grows more complex.

New information transactions are

occurring to provide operators, customers and providers with the information they require
to make effective, timely decisions.

The current infrastructure is mostly based off

internet protocol (IP) technology to provide the required real-time information transfers.
IP-based technologies such as transmission control protocol (TCP) and user datagram
protocol (UDP) are used to for information exchanges and have enabled the use of
extensible markup language (XML) tagging to help with data format issues [54].
As discussed in [57], IP provides basic address identification information to help
route information transfers from one point in a network to another. It helps identify
components and lets them talk to each other. TCP is a connection-oriented protocol
designed for reliable communication between two nodes in a network. It guarantees that
all the data will be received in the correct order. UDP on the other hand is connectionless
and does not provide for error correction or guaranteed delivery. It does however provide
for more rapid data delivery as a connection does not need to be established. It also has a
lower overhead since less information needs to be transferred in each given message.
These conditions make UDP the fastest and least complicated way to transmit data
resulting in its use for most real-time applications. XML standardizes the data format
and creates tags that help applications identify and exchange information in an
interoperable manner [54]. It has helped synchronize database information and enabled
data sharing for new and innovative purposes.
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2.3.3 The Smart Grid Transition and New Threats
These improvements in network and tagging abilities have helped shape the path
towards incorporating technology to improve grid reliability and optimize energy
generation and distribution. The most significant challenge in moving towards this goal
is protecting the information that will be required to improve grid awareness and make
optimizing decisions. Interconnections will be incorporated in new devices that make
power control decisions based on preference information that may be pulled from
financial databases. Security measures will need to be implemented cooperatively to
protect the system as a whole from cyber and physical threats.
Attacks against electric utilities are becoming more attractive due to the effects
that can be created. Customer databases are large and contain financial and personal
information. These systems receive more cyber security attention than control equipment
because they are more closely related to corporate networks. However, as researchers
look towards the transition, the security focus is becoming more encompassing. In [55],
Shaw writes that directly controlling switch equipment and transformers is the biggest
threat to grid stability. Protective relays are positioned at locations where they have the
potential to interrupt failures from spreading and cascading. More advanced relays have
more complex communications needs and thus require a different level of protection than
they originally did.
If access to relays is granted, hackers would be able to directly control breaker
actions and protection settings.

As the age of the Smart Grid approaches where

information is widely shared, it is likely that relays at remote locations will link to the
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control and corporate networks to allow remote status checking and setting adjustment.
Additional layers of security such as trust measurements from behavior observation can
be used for distributed, autonomous protective actions that should help mitigate some of
the effects if an intrusion were to occur and traditional protective schemes fail.
2.4 Reputation-Based Trust and Agents in Distributed Systems
Researchers have acknowledged a need to secure networked SCADA
communications in [14]. The inclusion of agents in these control systems using an
autonomous information exchange implementation creates a P2P network among the
intelligent agents. Agents can learn who to interact with either at initialization or through
topology discovery methods during routine operations.

Agents can interact through

communication to determine the reliability of other agents.
2.4.1 Using Trust to Measure Reliability of Distributed Communications
The reliability of other agents could be tracked using a trust system. Trust as a
concept has been formalized by Dr. Stephen Marsh in [35] where he described it as a
degree of confidence in information obtained from a known or unknown source when the
outcome of a decision using that information is uncertain. Trust is also a central concern
in many multi-agent distributed systems where agents base decisions on information
obtained from other agents. This information can be obtained directly, indirectly, or with
some combination of methods as discussed in [51].
When implementing a trust system, to aid in decision making agents need to put a
value on information obtained from others using a trust metric, where a trust metric is
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defined as system measurements used to quantify the reliability of other agents. This
value can come in the form of user satisfaction scores common in e-commerce situations
and in P2P systems. Typically, P2P systems are thought of as file-sharing systems such
as Gnutella, Kazaa, and BitTorrent or communications systems such as Skype. A typical
problem in these P2P networks is that there is a lack of accountability due to the
anonymous nature of the network and the potential for misuse is increased based on that
anonymity. Ensuring appropriate peer behavior using trust management systems has
been discussed in papers such as [5], [33], [42], [51], and [65].
Trust as described in these systems generally is based off of policy, reputation or
a combination of these descriptors. Trust can be established at the individual or system
level. It can be subjective and is subject to change, making an extensive record of
historical actions not necessarily representative of future performance. The time period
that must be tracked is dependent upon the system, the type of protection, and tolerance
that is acceptable. Policy-based trust is implemented in networks using credentials such
as passwords or keys and often provides access control functions as described in [5].
Combining policy-based trust with reputation-based trust is becoming more common as
suggested in [33] and [39].
2.4.2 Reputation-Based Collaborative Trust Systems
In reputation-based trust systems, there are a variety of methods for computing
and storing trust. Trust is usually based off of a trust value that is dependent upon a
history of interactions that are rated on a scale of success. Trust can either be calculated
by directly tracking interactions or expanded to create a more system-wide view by
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accepting the values created by another node. While typically used in implementations
for online file-sharing or e-business rating systems, these reputation-based schemes can
play a part in helping improve the overall security when implementing agent-based
protective measures in the power grid. The intelligent agent computing power could be
harnessed for distributed trust calculations.
Decentralized trust computations take the burden off a centralized server and take
advantage of resources that exist in the system.

Agents have immediate access to

knowledge and can share information when required, minimizing the distance that data
requests have to travel over the network. Theses local trust values can be aggregated
where necessary to improve a single agent’s overall view of the network.
One such system, described in [28] is called EigenTrust. This system focuses on
using both direct and indirect experiences to calculate a trust value using a concept
known as transitive trust. Peers rate other peers with whom they have had a direct
interaction. To expand their view, these trust values are exchanged with other peers in
order to aggregate ratings and reevaluate peers or provide a peer with a trust value
indirectly. It continues spreading information this way to spread trust values globally
throughout the system.
A second collaborative reputation-based trust system, Project NICE, was
developed at the University of Maryland for decentralized applications using shared
resources.

Lee, Sherwood and Bhattacharjee worked on establishing a distributed

scheme for trust inference in P2P networks at UMD that efficiently stored user reputation
information in a distributed manner [32]. Their work focused on a decentralized trust
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inference scheme that could be used to infer trust across an arbitrary number of levels
while requiring a limited amount of storage at each node. Agents created local trust
values using the algorithm they deemed appropriate.
2.4.3 Explanation of the Trust System Used in this Research
The trust system implementation used in this research was inspired by the work
done for Project NICE. As described by Lee in [32], the NICE platform was used for
cooperative distributed applications. In the original implementation, applications using
this protocol bartered resource certificates to gain access to remote services.
The idea behind this certificate exchange was that agents could redeem issued
certificates at a later time to receive resources or storage as a payment scheme. The
NICE protocol used network communications to share information and exchange
certificates required for trust decisions.

There are three main steps in a typical

implementation. First, an agent advertises the resources it has to offer and its location.
Second, an agent needing resources arranges bartering and trading of resource
certificates. Finally, a distributed trust valuation is accomplished based on the results of
the transaction, creating a value for the interacting nodes.
Depending on the computing resources available and implementation desired,
trust values can be stored either locally or remotely (or a combination of methods can be
used). As discussed in [32] each method has its own advantages and disadvantages.
Remote storage of trust values typically requires a public key system to digitally sign
trust and identity information using a hash algorithm creating a trust cookie in the
process. In contrast, local storage methods reduce the communications requirements and
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can reduce some of the time needed for the verification associated with the sending and
retrieval of trust values.
These methods of distributed reputation-based trust management can be
successfully applied in an agent-based power system protection scheme.

When

integrated with other forms of traditional network protection, they are an essential
component helping add security and reliability to the data exchanges. This additional
layer of trust verification can help operators identify behavior-based anomalies rapidly
for time-sensitive critical infrastructure protection.
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III. Methodology

T

HIS chapter presents an original methodology for integrating reputation-based
cooperative trust as an additional layer of security for backup protection systems.

The new agent scheme integrates behavioral-based analysis with an agent-based
protection scheme. Independent, distributed intelligent agents can use the reputation
information from this analysis to improve decision-making and responses. The data
obtained while observing the behavior of cooperating agents can also be used to make a
judgment regarding the reliability of any information obtained from the observed agent.
There are three main goals for this chapter. First, this chapter will describe the
approach taken to integrate the peer-to-peer cooperative trust scheme that was adapted for
use in this agent-based protection environment. Second, it explains the simulation setup
and the methodology that was selected to obtain significant and meaningful results by
describing the integrated model and tools upon which this research was based. Third, it
reviews the original malicious simulation scenarios that a particular implementation of
the cooperative trust scheme could encounter and explains the experimental parameters
used in this agent-based backup protection system.
3.1 Research Objectives
As described in Chapter II, it is essential that protection systems implement relay
settings appropriate for the situation and operating conditions. Research has shown that
intelligent agents embedded into protective components such as relays have the ability to
add system stability [64]. This stability is gained as agents acquire remote information ad
assemble it into a more complete situational picture to make an increased number of
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correct decisions more rapidly than traditional methods allow, especially when exposed
to a more open communications network.
The transition to a more interconnected Smart Grid requires additional
information sharing to help improve system operator situational awareness. Agents have
the ability to analyze information and behavior improving this awareness.

The

information can be exchanged between central systems and protection agents to enable
operators to remotely review system status and settings and make complementary
adjustments that support those made automatically by the agents. This improved system
awareness will prevent situational lapses that often result in cascading outages.
Grid transformation requires a renewed focus on cyber security due to the
increased reliance on the communications infrastructure. Modernization necessitates
evaluating component vulnerabilities. Solutions to protect against exploitation need to
increase security while maintaining interoperability and real-time data exchange.
Traditional network security measures need to be modified to meet time restrictions and
typically introduce unacceptable delays into the system.

The proposed agent-based

protection scheme integrates a reputation-based trust system that provides behavioralbased analysis with limited overhead.
A reputation-based trust system was integrated with an intelligent agent designed
to be compatible with work accomplished in [64] enabling the new agent to perform
additional analysis of other agent behavior. The new agent’s success was determined by
performance comparison with the original agent scheme and with traditional protection
mechanisms during times of malicious communications to validate the hypothesis that the
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reputation-based trust component could clear faults no slower than traditional protection
mechanisms and produce a higher percentage of correct behaviors than the agent-based
scheme originally proposed in [64].
Performance of the new trust agent was measured through simulation by
comparing the time needed to clear an electrical fault condition using the backup
protection provided by the new agent incorporating the trust scheme with the time
associated with traditional zone 3 distance relay settings that are traditionally on the order
of one second [24]. To account for the effects of malicious behavior, the correctness of
the agent actions were also annotated and compared with the actions taken by the original
agent created in [64]. The definition for correct behavior was adapted from performance
classifications given in [7]. A correct decision was defined by an agent disregarding
fraudulent messages and not extending the isolated portion of the grid beyond what was
required to clear the fault.
3.2 Collaborative, Reputation-Based Trust Approach
3.2.1 Trust Implementation for Protection Agent
For this project, a simplified implementation of the NICE algorithm was
implemented based around stand-alone simulator code provided by Lee [32] for an
extended paper at http://www.cs.umd.edu/projects/nice/. The modified implementation
maintained most of the capabilities that were proposed by the original research, but
minimized the traffic that needed to be exchanged between nodes by using local trust
storage. Due to the unique and predictable message traffic that would be sent throughout
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the agent protection system, many of the values could be standardized by message type.
Other features were adjusted to fit this unique application.
The authors recommended that remote storage be used to add some protection
from denial-of-service attacks. This forces the requesting node to prove their trust to the
serving node and prevents malicious nodes from forcing agents to search other peers for a
non-existent trust value. Limiting the agents with whom communications are allowed to
a specific subgroup reduced the need for this type of protection in this agent
implementation.
Initial experimentation using this trust algorithm was designed to take advantage
of local trust computation and storage. Trust valuations were not shared throughout the
system to create global trust values and the scheme was designed to operate without
cookie exchanges to reduce message size and network traffic. In fact, no additional
communications were exchanged between agents.

This format replicated Wang’s

original experimental results from [64] while validating the trust computation methods.
Nodes would not share trust information in this setup, nor could they replace untrusted
nodes with trusted ones.
3.2.2 Agent Communications Topology
Agent nodes were arranged in a structure created for joint system protection and
were statically arranged to communicate with a preselected set of neighbors.

This

arrangement ensured communications with agents who would traditionally provide safety
should protection efforts fall back on non-agent methods if communications were
interrupted or terminated. In this implementation, agents would not be able to form
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cliques only with other highly trusted agents as it could leave gaps in protective coverage.
Agents have to be more selective in choosing trusted agents from their limited agent pool,
basing decisions around the established topology as well as the trust metrics.
Preset communications were established for a given agent with three distinct
groups. The first group consisted of any other agent sharing primary protection of the
line. The second group was more extensive. This group included agents who augmented
the primary protection by providing backup protection for that same line segment. The
third group consisted of any intermediary agents located between the original agent and
agents providing backup protection who were not responsible for protecting that given
line segment.
Agent communications were then broken into two components.

The first

component was agent communications with the local power system interface which will
be described in more detail in Section 3.2.3. The second component was agent-agent
communications described in Section 3.2.4.

These two components were used in

conjunction to first obtain local power system conditions and then send that information
to an agent belonging to one of the specified groups.
3.2.3 Communications Between Agents and Power System
Agent interactions with the power system included three types of messages. The
first two types were a query and response for local state information. In response to a
query, the agent obtained voltage and current measurements for each of the three phases
of electric power as well as fault indications for the primary and backup protection zone
and any primary or backup signals sent to the breaker directing a trip.
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The third

classification was a message to the breaker directing a breaker trip or directing the
breaker to block the previously observed trip signal. The information obtained from the
power system was temporarily stored to be exchanged with other agents.
3.2.4 Agent-Agent Communications
Communications messages between agents were classified as one of three types
as well. The first two types were considered routine. First, each time period agents
queried other agents for conditions at the remote location with information query
messages. Second, agents would respond to a query by sending the local data that was
obtained from their power system query using an information response message. The last
type of message exchanged between agents was the set equipment message. It was
intended to be used when an agent was unable to clear a fault itself. This message was
defined as an advisory message to another agent that local protection mechanisms failed
and coordinated help was necessary to clear the fault condition from a remote location.
The information query and response messages were sent to each agent with whom
communications were preselected.

This included the other primary agents, backup

agents, and any intermediary agents. The set equipment messages were originally limited
to the neighboring agent in either direction, but could be expanded to include the next
logical agent in line depending upon the conditions and trust implementation that was
selected.

Reputation information was not exchanged between agents in this

implementation. Trust metrics were based on direct observations. An inherited trust
scheme that relied on referral information from others as described by [5] could
potentially be integrated, but is not necessary and generates additional problems.
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3.2.5 Cycle of Repeated Agent/Power System Interactions
Wang’s original experiments were replicated after incorporating the NICEinspired trust computation and storage system.

In the simulations in [64], agents

primarily communicated only with their immediate neighbors responsible for the shared
protection of a line segment. This was expanded for use in the improved trust system as
described in the previous section to better enable fault and system state verification.
Agent communications occurred in a cycle where the local power system
conditions were first obtained. The agent then checked response messages that were
received to determine if other agents detected any fault conditions. Agents used this
information to verify if agent behavior matched known malicious activity and identified
bad agents. Next, each agent responded to any messages querying for remote system or
verified and reacted to set equipment messages. Finally, it queried all agents in the
applicable protection regions for current state information and waited for responses.
3.2.6 Trust Metric Computations
In this new research designed to expand upon the work in [64], trust between
agents was based on the interactions from status queries and the applicable response
messages to focus on agent availability as opposed to message integrity. Observed
behavior was also compared against predefined conditions that were used to identify
malicious agents. Behaviors such as improperly sending set equipment messages or
failing to trip a breaker when conditions warranted a trip were used to define malicious
agents. Other implementations could be created that would not only depend on the
frequency of communications, but also on comparisons of remote readings with local
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measurements to include a measure of quality or correctness into the rating.

For

simplicity, this implementation only validated remote readings when sending or receiving
set equipment messages.
The simple example in Figure 4 demonstrates how trust metrics are developed and
maintained for a pair of communicating neighboring nodes. The number of query (Q)
messages sent and responses (R) received are tracked for each agent with whom
communications has been directed, in this case agents 4 and 5. A successful interaction,
defined as a response to a query message, is stored as a 1. An unsuccessful interaction is
stored as a 0. A trust rating is then calculated for each individual agent by dividing the
number of responses received by the number of queries sent as
Trust rating

# responses received (in last 100 time steps)
# queries sent (in last 100 time steps )

(3.1)

These computations result in a trust rating for each paired agent between 0 and 1. A
positive rating represents an agent that is trusted to some degree. A higher ratio of
successful interactions equated to a higher trust rating for that neighbor. An agent that is
not trusted will be classified as bad using additional analysis, in which case it will receive
a discontinuous rating of -1. Behavior resulting in a classification of bad can be seen in
Table 1. This table is used to check for malicious behavior and can be tailored for a
specific implementation to create the desired effects by adjusting the restrictions.
Table 1.

Observed Behavioral Conditions Used to Classify an Agent as Bad

Condition #
1
2

Behavior
Agent sends false set equipment messages
(in excess of the established threshold of 3 in the last 0.05 seconds)
Agent trip action fails during valid fault conditions
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Agent 5

Agent 4
Time: 0.000
R 0 0 0 0
Q 0 0 0 0
Trust of 5: 0

Time: 0.000
R 0 0 0 0
Q 0 0 0 0
Trust of 4: 0

Time: 0.002
R 0 0 0 0
Q 1 0 0 0
Trust of 5: 0

Query sent

Time: 0.004
R 1 0 0 0
Q 1 1 0 0
Trust of 5: 0.5

Reply sent; Query sent

Time: 0.006
R 1 1 0 0
Q 1 1 1 0
Trust of 5: 0.667

Reply sent; Query sent

Time: 0.008
R 1 1 1 0
Q 1 1 1 1
Trust of 5: 0.75

Reply sent; Query sent

Time: 0.010
R 0 1 1 0
Q 1 1 1 1
Trust of 5: 0.5

Reply sent; Query sent

Time: 0.012
R 0 0 1 0
Q 1 1 1 1
Trust of 5: 0.25

Reply sent; Query sent

Time: 0.014
R 0 1 0 0
Q 1 1 1 1
Trust of 5: 0.25

Reply sent; Query sent

Query sent

Reply sent; Query sent

Reply sent; Query sent

Reply sent; Query sent

Query sent

Query sent

Reply sent; Query sent

Time: 0.002
R 0 0 0 0
Q 1 0 0 0
Trust of 4: 0
Time: 0.004
R 1 0 0 0
Q 1 1 0 0
Trust of 4: 0.5
Time: 0.006
R 1 1 0 0
Q 1 1 1 0
Trust of 4: 0.667
Time: 0.008
R 1 1 1 0
Q 1 1 1 1
Trust of 4: 0.75
Time: 0.010
R 0 1 1 1
Q 1 1 1 1
Trust of 4: 0.75
Time: 0.012
R 1 0 1 1
Q 1 1 1 1
Trust of 4: 0.75
Time: 0.014
R 1 1 0 1
Q 1 1 1 1
Trust of 4: 0.75

Figure 4. Example of trust computations: Shows seven information exchanges.
Demonstrates how completed information exchanges are tracked to arrive
at a current value of trust for a neighboring node.
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The data an agent uses to compute trust values must be timely. In the simulations,
request and response messages were sent approximately every 2 milliseconds. Older data
in the trust computation is replaced with more recent data using a sliding window
scheme. As shown in Figure 4, agents start with a trust value of 0 and slowly build trust
by responding to data query messages as shown from the time period from 0.000 to
0.008. In the provided example, Agent 5 stops sending response messages from time
0.010 to 0.012 causing its trust valuation to be lowered.

This lack of reliable

communication indicates that it may not perform as expected during critical situations.
Ideally, agents want to respond to every query message, achieving the maximum
trust rating of 1. Realistically, a trust rating of close to 1 is all that can typically be
achieved due to the time delay required for message propagation. Unless an agent stops
communication (which is not likely during normal operation) it will repeatedly send
information queries (one each time period) as opposed to a scheme where an agent must
wait for a response before sending its next query. In this manner, an agent will always
have an outstanding query that has not yet been answered, resulting in an optimal trust
rating lower than the theoretical maximum.
3.2.7 Reducing Trust and Using the Trust Metrics
Trust valuations are lowered if agents stop responding to information requests.
Agents may stop responding to requests due to issues such as communication failure or
interference, internal faults of either the sending or receiving agent, programmed
behavior (malicious or benign) or a variety of other issues. Trust values may also be
lowered if communications meet specified preprogrammed conditions such as sending
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conflicting information, advertising faults when none actually exist or failing to take
proper corrective actions. The trust values are then used when an agent sends or receives
a message to or from another agent directing different equipment settings to assess that
information source or destination. An agent with a trust value above the threshold can be
assumed to be acting in the best interest of the protection system, whereas an agent with a
rating below the cutoff can be assumed to have an issue with providing reliable
information updates and thus protection. The information received from an agent below
the threshold should be considered more carefully before it is acted upon.
The scheme must also be able to classify an agent with whom it has previously
interacted as a bad agent. In this implementation, an agent classified as bad will receive a
trust rating of -1 to indicate that it is not trusted and distinguish it from an agent with
whom communications have not been established or were terminated using the behaviors
depicted in Table 1. This rating is based on behavior and verification of message content
and overrides the independent calculations associated with responding to queries. While
this classification can be made for many reasons, an agent must consider the decision
carefully before making this assignment. In some cases, the scheme may not be able to
distinguish whether the agent is malicious or faulty, however there would still be benefit
in reverting to an alternate protection scheme.
This implementation does not implement a procedure to recover from a bad
classification. This is primarily due to the fact that maintenance would be required to
either fix the protection components or the software at the remote location. An out of
band process is recommended to reset the system after corrective actions are completed.
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3.2.8 Decision Matrix Guiding Agent Behavior
To gain insight as to how the trust system would help the agents make decisions
under different scenarios, a mechanism for detecting and responding to observed
abnormal behavior was developed. The rule set that was proposed in [64] was modified
to account for the addition of trust information and behavior analysis. The modified rules
are presented as Table 2. This is similar to the rule set that helps guide alerts in an
Intrusion Detection System. The agents needed guidance to react in a manner so as to
increase the overall protection of the system under a majority of the test scenarios
depicting both normal and abnormal system conditions.
The matrix detailed a set of rules that can be described using conditional statements. If a
certain condition was met, one action was taken; if not met, a different action was taken.
The rules now incorporate results from trust computation as additional conditions that
must be satisfied to help decide which actions should be taken. Additionally, the rules
were modified to let an agent adjust trust levels and classify and agent as bad if the
observed behavior matched conditions specified in Table 1.
3.3 Collaborative Agent-based Protection System Simulation Tools
This research focused on integrating cooperative, reputation-based trust to support
the agent-based scheme used for transmission system protection in [64]. The research
presented here built upon the original experiments that show compact trip zone coverage
and simultaneously reduced fault clearing time as presented in that research.

The

experiments covered here were run using the Electric Power and Communication
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Table 2.

Decision Matrix for Agent Behavior: Trust Inclusive Agent-Based Protection
Scheme Modified from [64] (original rules shaded, trust changes in italics)

Rule
No.

Situation

1

The relay
sends a trip
signal
(to local CB
indicating a
zone 1 fault
was detected)

2

3

4

The relay
sends a trip
signal
(to local CB
indicating a
zone 3 fault
was detected)

Uncertain 2

5

6

A set
equipment
notification
message is
received when
relay
operations are
in progress

8

Then…

Action

there are no corresponding zone 3 relay
operations in the agent’s transmission
region of concern from trusted agents
and trusted agents exist

the relay sent an
incorrect trip signal

Stop the breaker trip

any of the trusted relays in the concerned
region send a validated trip signal

the relay sent a correct
trip signal

Monitor the breaker for
operational failure – Adjust relay
trust levels if necessary

another situation occurs

Situation is Uncertain
1

Continue to Rule 2

there is a fault in the zone 1 protection
zone

there was a correct
relay trip

there is not a fault in the zone 1
protection zone

there was an incorrect
relay trip

at least one trusted agent indicates a zone
1 relay trip in the concerned region

the relay operated
correctly, continue to
trip if fault is not
cleared in allotted time

Monitor the breaker for
operational failure – Adjust relay
trust levels if necessary

there was no zone 1 relay trips from
trusted agents in the concerned region

Situation is Uncertain
2

Continue to Rule 4

there is a fault in the zone 1 protection
zone

there was a local relay
failure

there is a fault in the zone 3 protection
zone

there was a remote
relay failure

there is not a fault in the zone 3
protection zone

there was an incorrect
zone 3 relay operation
the breaker is
malfunctioning and not
providing local
protection
remote breaker failure
occurred in agent’s
protection zone

Uncertain 1

Operational
failure of
breaker is
noted

7

If…

A set
equipment
notification
message is
received when
no relay
operations are
in progress

Uncertain 3

breaker fails to operate correctly in time
allotted
message is received from adjacent agent
in same direction as indicated fault and
trusted agents verified fault conditions
message is received from adjacent agent
in opposite direction as indicated fault
and fault conditions are verified with
trusted agents in that direction
message is received from a more distant /
non-trusted agent or fault is not verified
message is received from a trusted agent
and fault conditions are verified with
trusted agents in appropriate direction
message is received from an agent who is
not trusted
fault conditions are identified/verified
and any time delay to allow intermediate
agents to clear the fault has passed
fault conditions are not
identified/verified when time delay has
expired
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Monitor the breaker for
operational failure – Adjust relay
trust levels if necessary
Prevent the breaker from
tripping – Continue to monitor
for fault conditions and adjust
relay trust levels if necessary

Trip the breaker and monitor the
breaker for failures – Adjust
relay trust levels if necessary
Trip the breaker and monitor the
breaker for failures – Adjust
relay trust levels if necessary
Stop the breaker trip – Adjust
relay trust levels if necessary
Send set equipment notification
messages to the agents in the
concerned region
Trip the breaker and monitor the
breaker for failures – Adjust
relay trust levels if necessary

remote breaker failure
occurred outside
agent’s protection zone

Trip the breaker and monitor the
breaker for failures – Adjust
relay trust levels if necessary

Situation is Uncertain
3

Continue to Rule 8

remote breaker failure
occurred

Trip the breaker and monitor the
breaker for failures – Adjust
relay trust levels if necessary

Situation is Uncertain
3

Continue to Rule 8

possible remote relay
and breaker failures
there is no fault in the
system, invalid
message

Trip the breaker and monitor the
breaker for failures – Adjust
relay trust levels if necessary
No control action is required –
Adjust relay trust levels if
necessary

Agent

AgentHQ

Agent
Agent

Legend
Simulators
Federated
Communication
Combined
Systems
Custom
Modules

RTI

PSCAD/
EMTDC

NS2

Figure 5. EPOCHS infrastructure:
Depicting interactions between the NS2
communications simulator, the PSCAD/EMTDC power simulator and the
EPOCHS agents. The Runtime Infrastructure (RTI) is a central interface
location allowing for time synchronization and message passing [23]

Synchronizing Simulator (EPOCHS) to synchronize the Power System Computer Aided
Design (PSCAD) power system simulator and the NS2 network simulator as seen in
Figure 5.
3.3.1 EPOCHS
In order to model the complex relationships between the electric power infrastructure and
communications networks, a simulation tool needs to combine information from different
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systems to create one complete picture of the scenario. Researchers at Cornell University
developed EPOCHS to link power system simulations to communications simulators.
EPOCHS uses an agent-based framework to combine different simulations using their
built-in interfaces enabling communications events to be involved in other power
scenarios.
Hopkinson wrote that ―EPOCHS was designed to link multiple simulations into a
distributed environment (federation)‖ [23]. Combining simulators is becoming more
popular as an approach to model complex interconnected systems. While standardization
efforts are underway to enable better information sharing between simulators, many
simulations include COTS products for which no source code is available. EPOCHS’ use
of agents helps combine information from both simulation systems, providing integration
designed so that the simulations advance at the same clock rate.
This technique enables researches to use the best simulator for their needs without
sacrificing quality for the sake of interoperability. EPOCHS used an agent headquarters
and a run-time infrastructure as shown in Figure 5 to synchronize and coordinate
simulations that would otherwise run at different speeds. In this simulation, the EPOCHS
agent headquarters synchronized the PSCAD simulator with the NS2 communications
simulator to allow agents to communicate with each other and interact with the power
simulation. Time steps were set at 0.002 seconds for this follow-on experimentation.
3.3.2 PSCAD/EMTDC
PSCAD (Power System Computer Aided Design) is a commercial tool used to
generate graphical representations of power systems for simulation use. In conjunction
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with the EMTDC (Electromagnetic Transients including DC), electro-magnetic transients
simulation engine, these programs allow for the analysis of power systems during system
disturbances. They also allow parameters to be varied to simulate control actions taken
in response to environmental changes.

By providing the user with time domain

instantaneous responses (also known as electromagnetic transients) through a graphical
user interface, these systems allow for better analysis and understanding than previous
text only simulators [34].
PSCAD/EMTDC was used to create the transmission network and display system
measurements during the experiments.

Measurement data and status values were

exported to be used by the agents providing system protection. The simulations were
kept in synch using EPOCHS and communications between agents took place using NS2.
This communications simulator provided the agents with a way to exchange information
before interacting with the power simulator again.
3.3.3 NS2
NS2 (Network Simulator 2) is used to simulate discrete events for network
simulation. Development began in 1995 with support from Lawrence Berkeley Labs,
Xerox PARC, University of California at Berkeley, and University of Southern California
[46]. Due to the public availability of the source code, NS2 is widely used in research for
large scale communications simulations and protocol investigation. Coding is based
around C++ for processing performance combined with Tcl scripts for simulation control.
This split programming adds flexibility and separates mechanism from policy when
designing simulations [8].
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The implementation used for the experiments combined NS2, the RTI, the
AgentHQ and agents into a single executable. The ability to create protocol stubs within
NS2 allowed the RTI to interface between the different components in a synchronized
manner [8].

A single executable for these components provided performance

enhancements compared to running additional programs.

The simulation required

corresponding networks for both the power system and communications infrastructure.
3.4 Experimental Environment
A simplified transmission line network was created in PSCAD consisting of two power
sources, one at either end separated by three substations and connected together by four
transmission lines as depicted in Figure 6. Every transmission line is protected with two
circuit breakers. The breakers are located at either end of the line and each is controlled
by a distance relay. The distance between substations is depicted in that figure as well
since it is not shown to scale.

R1
B1

R2
B2

100 km

R3
B3

R4
B4

R5
B5

120 km

R6
B6

162 km

R7
B7

R8
B8

270 km

Figure 6. Simulated 400 kV power system used in the experiments: Depicts a
generation source at either end, four transmission lines, and eight circuit
breakers (B1-B8), each protected by an IED relay (R1-R8) [23]. Transmission
line lengths are provided since diagram is not to scale.
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The original experiments in [64] were designed to protect a 400 kV high-voltage
transmission system against a three-phase fault using distance protection methods. In the
simulations, request and response messages were sent approximately every 2
milliseconds.

Communications between agents included measurements taken from

current transformers, voltage transformers, and anti-aliasing filters. Relay protection was
provided by distance and time-delay relays using traditional settings. The distance relays
used the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) to obtain inputs. Experiments were conducted
based on two different situations. The first situation involved incorrect operation of a
zone 1 relay. In the second scenario, circuit breakers were designed to fail in the closed
position, failing to open when directed by their respective relay.
3.4.1 Original Communications Setup
In the work done by Wang, agents communicated at a very simplified level and
no background traffic was simulated, eliminating effects caused by network congestion.
Each substation bus resulted in a one millisecond propagation delay added to
communications. The messages between agents consisted of requests for system state
(voltage, current, breaker status, etc.) at another agent location, requests for an agent to
set a breaker at their location and any applicable replies to those requests. Agents would
then make use of that information to collaboratively clear a fault in as small a region as
possible.

Agent communications were limited to a node’s immediate neighbors or

immediate neighbors plus an additional agent protecting the adjacent line.
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3.4.2 Revised Communications Setup
The revised communications setup for these experiments included a more
complete range of agents to help coordinate protective actions. Communications were
needed with all agents responsible for providing zone 1 protection of the primary line and
each adjacent line segment. This allows agents to verify fault conditions in zone 1
segments, zone 3 segments and adjacent line segments that it was not responsible for
protecting based on the interactions with those agents. Agents observing a zone 3 relay
signal would monitor the appropriate agents responsible for primary protection to verify
that they attempted to trip their local breakers and the success or failure of that trip. They
could use this data to observe whether the agent was working correctly or not and
determine if they needed to take action. This action could be accomplished without
waiting the traditional amount of time to see the effects of the stabilization attempt at
their location.
Additionally, when trust was lost with an agent responsible for primary
protection, the set equipment request could be sent to the next agent in line available to
take protective actions. The receiving agent had the option to either trip immediately or
first verify that the fault was not actually cleared before tripping the breaker at their
location. If the fault was cleared by the agent who was believed to be untrustworthy, the
agent would be exonerated otherwise they would be classified as bad. By increasing the
number of set equipment message recipients, the trust system improved clearing time.
This and the original research are stepping stones for improved relay
communications that could be incorporated into larger SCADA protection schemes.
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During the transition to a Smart Grid, data retrieved from monitors and passed between
agents could also be used to update the central control facility. These updates would
provide the system operator with additional details necessary for improved situational
awareness. The intelligent agent protection scheme forms the cooperative environment
upon which the remainder of this research is based.
3.5 Experimental Situation and Issue Requiring Backup Protection
These revised rules from Table 2 that guide agent actions must remain applicable
when using trust in the normal non-malicious environment and should enable the system
to match the performance achieved in the original experiments. This research first
attempted to replicate the performance of the original agent-protection scheme using
scenarios based around Wang’s second case in [64]. In this simulation set up, a fault was
triggered at the midpoint of the line protected by Breaker 5 and Breaker 6 as shown in
Figure 7. A fault at a location such as this should be caught by the primary zone 1
protection provided by relays 5 and 6 as well as the zone 3 backup protection from relays
3 and 8.

R1
B1

R2
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100 km

R3
B3

R4
B4

R5
B5

120 km

R6
B6
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R7
B7

R8
B8

270 km

Figure 7. Experimental transmission grid showing fault location: Fault depicted at the
midpoint between breaker 5 (B5) and breaker 6 (B6).
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In this case, the relay providing signals to breaker 5 notices that the breaker fails
to open and sends a trip signal to relay 4 to clear the fault by cutting out the smallest
amount of line. Relay 4 attempts to trip breaker 4. Unfortunately, this breaker fails to
open as well and relay 4 sends a signal to relay 3 to open that breaker. Breaker 3 receives
the signal from relay 3 and operates correctly, clearing the fault in less time than
traditional protection measures would. During the original experimentation, the fault was
cleared at 0.188 seconds with the agent system as opposed to 1.592 seconds with a
traditional relay backup protection system.
The other case that was considered in [64] involved a false trip signal detected at
Breaker 5. The agent based scheme used the information from cooperating agents to
block this false trip signal and prevent the breaker from opening. The improved trust
scheme must be able to continue to act correctly to this issue when subjected to malicious
behavior. Since protection capability is dependent upon communications from partner
agents, the robustness of the trust scheme must continue to protect from false breaker
trips even when information update messages are not sent by a neighboring agent or if
they receive false set equipment requests. This feature was tested using two scenarios.
In one, Agent 4 did not send any message traffic to Agent 5. In the second, Agent 4 sent
false set equipment requests to Agent 5.
3.6 Experimental Scenarios Used in the Analysis
Additional experimental scenarios mimicking potential real-world issues that
might be experienced were created to test the cooperative trust scheme. Eight new
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Table 3.

Experimental Scenarios: Non-Optimal/Malicious Agent Communications

Scenario #
1
2

Situation depicted
Baseline case – no malicious behavior
Agent 5 will not send information response messages

3

Agent 5 will not send set equipment messages

4
5
6
7

Agent 5 will not send information response or set equipment messages
Agent 5 sends false set equipment messages
Agent 4 will not send information response messages
Agent 4 will not send set equipment messages

8

Agent 4 will not send information response or set equipment messages

9

Agent 4 sends false set equipment messages

scenarios were developed, intended to mimic conditions that might be experienced by a
protective agent. These studies are based around a situation where a three-phase fault
occurs between breakers 5 and 6. Both breakers 5 and 4 will fail to operate when they
receive a trip signal, however this information is not known to the agents until fault
clearing is attempted. These scenarios are presented in Table 3.
In this research, a look at the overall system behavior was warranted since some
individual relays were designed to fail. To review, for these scenarios correct behavior
was defined as tripping the breaker only when an actual fault condition exists and only
isolating the minimum area between working breakers. The baseline scenario was added
to depict the normal communications environment. The other scenarios replicated effects
from some type of malicious activity aimed at interrupting or adding message traffic
between agents. There was not rule in Table 1 that used a lack of communication on its
own to classify an agent as bad. This was primarily due to the lack of a trust redemption
mechanism.
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3.7 Experimental Parameters Varied for the Trust System
Different trust implementations were developed by varying some of the
parameters involved with either trust computation or actions taken when trust was
lowered or lost.

The experimental trust-based implementations were tested initially

varying four parameters from Table 4 using a full factorial design for each of the first five
scenarios from Table 3. This was done to verify assumptions regarding the dependency
between trust system thresholds and percentage of network traffic lost.

Final

experimentation was accomplished using all nine scenarios and reducing the number of
parameters to two by holding the number of interactions tracked constant at 100 using the
sliding window scheme and the trust system threshold constant at 0.75. Agents were
initialized with a trust rating equal to the trust system threshold for this implementation.
The results were compared with the non-trust-based agent system’s performance in each
of those nine scenarios.
The number of interactions tracked was kept rather small to ensure that only the
most recent information was used to compute trust. Protection mechanisms need to be

Table 4.

Trust System Parameters Varied in Experiments

Level

# of Interactions
Tracked

Trust System
Threshold Value
(0-1)

Low

50

.95

High

100

.75
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Add additional
breaker to trip
list
When below
trust threshold
When an agent
is classified as
bad

Likelihood
network traffic
is lost
1%
10%

responsive to system failures that may be hidden for long periods of time [38]. The trust
system threshold values were selected based on the likelihood that network traffic was
lost.

Previous research suggested a range of values for lost UDP traffic in a

communications network with typical minimum values of 1% or less and maximum
values of less that 10% [4], [15], [21], [26], and [69]. These figures will differ depending
upon the type of underlying communications network supporting the protection plan as
described in [43] and [52]. Current work is under way to investigate protection for these
communication lines [49] and improve the communications reliability to provide better
system protection [66].
3.8 Methodology Synopsis
To summarize, this research will use simulation to conduct experiments
integrating a reputation-based trust system with a proposed backup protection system for
power networks revolving around agent-based communications. The simulations will use
EPOCHS to synchronize the inputs and outputs from the PSCAD/EMTDC power system
simulator with the NS2 communications network simulator as described in [64]. Trust
will be built between agents cooperating to provide backup protection through regular
status query and response messages. Information obtained from the response messages
will assist in behavioral analysis and enable the agent to build a more complete picture of
system events.

The trust system used in this protection scheme is inspired by the

distributed model for Project NICE [32] using a modified implementation to take
advantage of the unique situation posed by its application to the power system.
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The scenarios designed for the experiments demonstrate the ability of the
proposed trust-based protection system to provide more correct decisions than the
original agent-based protection implementation when presented with behavior mimicking
malicious activity as well as during normal operating conditions. The reputation-based
trust system will also enable more timely protective actions to take place. In turn the
additional analysis and improved system information is effective in preventing the
stability problems that contribute to cascades, further improving upon the traditional
distance relay protective mechanisms.
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IV. Results and Analysis

T

HIS chapter presents results from the experimental simulations and an analysis of
the impact from incorporating cooperative trust into a backup protection scheme

for power transmission networks.

First, results from the initial inclusion of a trust

monitoring system will be covered.

Second, investigative questions regarding the

importance of different system characteristics and dependence of some variables will be
examined. Third, results from each of the scenarios used in the simulation experiments
will be presented. Finally, an overall analysis of the results will be given in the last
section in this chapter.
4.1 Initial Trust Monitoring Scheme
Results from the experiments were favorable. The first set of experiments was
conducted to replicate the original results of Wang’s research while adding the
appropriate trust structure. The trust values were computed and stored however no
actions were taken using the trust computation results. This experimentation was done
solely to provide information that could be used as part of a centralized control
monitoring system providing system operators additional situational awareness about
device status, network communications, and agent behavior. The results demonstrate that
the system could perform at least as well as the original system while documenting
behavioral abnormalities and providing additional status information.
In these case studies, the fault at 0.3 seconds between agent 5 and agent 6 caused
agent 5 and agent 6 to properly detect a fault and send a signal to open their respective
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Figure 8. Fault clearing of agent-based protection system with trust scheme: Initial
experiment results showing the agent-based protection system with integrated
cooperative trust able to replicate the results achieved in [64]. Fault at 0.3
seconds cleared at 0.488 seconds by agent 3 and recognized by agent 5 at
0.506 seconds.
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circuit breaker as a result of primary protection trip signals as seen in Figure 8a. The
agent at relay 5 providing backup protection notices that the breaker does not open when
provided with a proper signal. Agent 5 sends a set equipment message to agent 4 as seen
in Figure 8b.

Agent 4 notices its breaker does not open and it sends another set

equipment message to agent 3 as shown in Figure 8c. Agent 3 is finally able to clear the
fault at approximately 0.488 seconds as shown from the current readings at relay 5 graph
in Figure 8d.
The results of this initial test appear identical to the results used by the system
without a trust component, because the trust information was gathered, but not used in
decision analysis. Unfortunately, this method of trust implementation would not add any
additional assistance to the agent’s decision making capability since it was not used
locally. To be of use in this type of system, this trust data would need to be collected by
a central monitoring station and interpreted there. The impact created would improve the
situational awareness of the operator and could help network analysis. Any action to
remedy the situation would have to be taken from his remote location.

Further

experiments showed that more timely decisions were made if agents used these metrics
autonomously for corrective actions. They also showed using these trust metrics resulted
in a higher percentage of correct decisions when faced with malicious activity.
4.2 Investigative Questions Answered
Prior to developing the final trust implementation this research examined the
parameters that were selected and analyzed their impact on the experimental scenarios.
In the second set of experiments, parameters were varied as depicted in Table 4 for the
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first five scenarios in Table 3. The purpose of this round of experimentation was to
verify the relative importance of each message type to the trust scheme. By establishing
a relationship between trust system settings and corresponding agent reactions, proper
system settings were verified and experiments documented failures resulting from
improper system setup.
Results from these experiments showed that use of the trust system was effective
in reducing fault clearing times when malicious activity was present in the system. The
original agent system typically reverted to traditional standby backup protection
mechanisms (as used in non-agent based protection systems shown in Figure 9) when
faced with a malicious situation that prevented authorized set equipment messages from

Figure 9. Fault clearing of traditional transmission line backup protection: Results from
traditional transmission line backup protection system based off a time delay
of 1.5 seconds as set in [64]. This is representative of the typical time it
would take to clear a fault in most current implementations set on the order of
1 second [24] and [59]. The agent system needed to provide better
performance in both normal situations and during periods of malicious activity
more closely approximating results achieved during normal activity and
shown in Figure 8.
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being sent. When the original system was faced with situations where unauthorized set
equipment messages were sent to agents, the lack of a mechanism to check the
trustworthiness of the sender caused an immediate breaker trip without first observing or
verifying fault indications.
The modified agent-based protection system including the trust calculations was
able to recognize an abnormal situation only when it caused a lack of trust. If recognized,
it could then react more quickly to the situation. This established the first fundamental
rule. The system must be programmed to recognize and react to specific behaviors. If a
specific behavior or action was recognized as matching a condition described in Table 1,
the agent was able to override the respective trust computation and distrust that agent
completely. A software based design allowed for the reprogramming of agents enabling
their decision making abilities to be upgraded, assisting with adaptive protection
capabilities.
A second lesson learned dealt with properly setting threshold trust values used for
agent classifications. Original parameter settings causing situations where the actual trust
rating was close to or below the trust threshold limit validated the assumption that
additional information must be considered in certain circumstances such as monitoring to
verify if an agent tripped or not. Initial experiments simulating a 10% loss of message
traffic and a trust threshold value of .95 required to classify an agent as good helped
demonstrate the improper agent reactions.
Although acting as programmed, an excessive number of agents were classified
below the trust threshold.

Because they should have been trusted, extraneous set
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equipment messages were sent into the system without proper reason. Set equipment
messages were originally limited to an agent’s immediate neighbors (one in each
direction). The new implementation included an option to send set equipment messages
to the next logical agent in line as well, bypassing agents that did not meet the trust
threshold.

These additional set equipment messages consumed communications

bandwidth and forced agents to do more work, but improved protection. This feature
enabled the trust system to isolate the fault more rapidly and reliably while increasing the
isolation area by the smallest amount. However, without proper safeguards, these extra
messages resulted in unnecessary circuit breaker trips that extending the recommended
isolation zone. When a message arrived from an agent that was more than one hop away,
actions were delayed. The more distant agent waited to verify the effect of any actions of
the agent that did not meet the trust threshold to determine if an extended breaker
opening was required.
A third lesson was observed during this experimentation. Normal information
exchanges between agents established trust, but also verified remote agent actions. In
both systems, the set equipment messages were used to inform of a local protection
problem. However in the original system, the information from the response messages
was only used to block a false local fault observation. In the expanded trust system,
information from remote agents was also used to verify fault conditions in multiple line
segments to improve coordinated protection as well as for the trust calculations.
When these response messages were lost, it directly affected the trust calculations
and caused temporary periods where an agent acting in a trusted manner (and able to
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clear faults) was incorrectly labeled with a low trust rating. To fix this problem, instead
of reacting solely on instantaneous information, the trust system was remodeled to
incorporate recent power system state information from the last 0.01 second.

This

accounted for a realistic degree of information loss in the system and improved data
verification.

Additionally, set equipment messages were sent twice to increase the

probability that they would reach their intended agent adding redundancy.
Adding redundancy to communications networks in power control systems was
recommended in [66] and [67].

Redundancy was added to the trust system fault

verification modules ensuring that adjacent node status was not lost due to a temporary
communication interruption or missed message using a sliding window to track signals
and measurements from the past 0.01 seconds. While communications redundancy is
often thought of as creating multiple independent paths between nodes, the implemented
method of resending and tracking recent information also created communications
redundancy. Agents validated local and remote power system settings more correctly
after its incorporation better compensating for parameter simulating lost network traffic.
It allowed for collaborating information that was obtained in different time slices while
ensuring the relative timeliness of reactions to that information. These changes added to
the trust agent implementation prevented the isolation region from be expanded
unnecessarily.
These preliminary experiments also helped standardize trust system parameters
used for the final set of experiments. In the trust implementation, the trust threshold
value was set accounting for at least twice the max expected value of a message being
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lost. Since the system relied on query and response messages, there were multiple
opportunities for a complete trust transaction to be interrupted. As a result in the final set
of experiments, the trust threshold was established at .75, analytically accounting for the
expected value of lost network traffic, expected propagation delay, and processing time
associated with the agent communications. This value limited the number of occasions
when trust calculations accidentally fell below the threshold.
Experimental results were similar when the number of tracked interactions was
varied. This was expected because the malicious scenarios evaluated in this research did
not attempt to exploit this aspect of the trust scheme.

However in an actual

implementation, the number of interactions tracked should be set according to the
importance that minor fluctuations have on the system, the trust update mechanism
selected, and the level of risk that an organization is willing to accept. The fewer
transactions tracked, the more rapidly temporary periods of communication interruption
will be forgotten. Trust will be lost and regained more quickly in this situation. In the
final experiments, tracked interactions were held constant at 100 resulting in a complete
information refresh every 0.2 seconds as opposed to 0.1 seconds with 50 tracked
interactions. This value should be adjusted after identifying the risk to threats attempting
to exploit reputation lag vulnerability [27]. More complex schemes that layer multiple
trust ratings by tracking short and long time windows can help mitigate some of this risk.
Additionally, it was noted that extending the list of agents to whom set equipment
messages were sent only if an agent was classified as bad, was not as effective as an
approach that relied also on the comparison of the calculated trust metric with the
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threshold value. Using solely the bad category limited the effectiveness of the system to
only those situations that met a scripted preprogrammed behavior.

Loosening the

restrictions and allowing the set messages to be sent to an extended set of recipients
added robustness, but increased the computational cost at each extended recipient. This
new policy enabled bypassing agents who might be later classified as bad. To prevent
premature reactions to these messages, a time delay was added to prevent the more
distant agent from opening a breaker without verifying that the fault was not cleared by
the less trusted neighbor. This delay was set at 0.05 seconds to account for the time
required for that agent to open its breaker and stabilizing effects of clearing the fault to be
noted in the voltage and current readings.
Finally, signal verifications taking place between the interacting nodes enabled
additional protection to be integrated into the system. Agents were able to take action
based on more immediate system feedback instead of waiting for timers to expire using
traditional mechanisms. They were able to directly compare readings and cross check
these readings with set equipment requests. This helped reduce the fault clearing time in
certain situations improving system stability.
4.3 Final Trust Scheme Results and Analysis
In the final trust scheme that was created, the additional verification and
redundancy integrated into the system resulted in a more successful trust system
implementation providing additional protection in the face of malicious agents. The trust
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Table 5.

Final set of parameters used for trust system experimentation and analysis

Selected Trust Implementation

# of
Interactions
Tracked

Trust system
threshold for
good agents

No Trust Scheme

Not
applicable

Not applicable

100

.75

Add additional breaker to trip
list when computed trust value is
below trust threshold
Add additional breaker to trip
list only after an agent is
classified as bad

Likelihood
network traffic is
lost
1%
10%
1%
10%
1%

100

.75
10%

system made correct decisions in all nine scenarios with the improved backup protection
mechanisms clearing faults in less than 1.0 seconds in all cases regardless of whether
breakers were added to the set list if they were below the trust threshold or only if they
were classified as bad. This was a significant improvement over the original agent
scheme with no trust integration.

Table 5 shows the breakdown of parameters for

experiments that were run for each scenario.
4.3.1 Sign Test for Median
Due to the relatively small sample size (25 simulation runs were accomplished at
each experimental setup) it was not reasonable to expect that the underlying distribution
was normal. First, nonparametric methods were used to compare the median values
obtained from experimentation using both the Sign Test for Median and the Wilcoxon
Signed-Rank Test (Appendix A contains more detailed analytic results using reduced
median times of 0.3 and 0.5 seconds that are closer to settings associated with zone 2
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protection [24]). For each of these tests, the null hypothesis states that the median trip
time is greater than or equal to 1.092 seconds accounting for a recommended time delay
on the order of 1.0 second [24] and [59]. The alternative hypothesis is that the median is
less than 1.092 seconds. In each of the scenarios, exactly 0 of the cases was observed to be greater than or equal to 1.092 seconds. The observed value of each of the test
statistics Q+ is 0. It is assumed that the Q+ is binomially distributed with p=1/2 [41]. In
this case n=25 and the P value is 0.000 [37], [50], and [68]. With a P value this small
(less than our alpha of .05), we reject the null hypothesis. There is strong statistical
evidence that the improved trust scheme is able to reduce the time required to clear the
fault.
4.3.2 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test
Additional statistical significance is provided using the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank
Test since our experimental results are reasonably symmetric. In this test, a value for W
of 0 was calculated again. When W = 0 with 25 samples, the P value for this test is less
than .005 [41]. This is too small to have occurred by chance. As a result, the null
hypothesis can be rejected and it is statistically accurate to state that the improved agentbased protection scheme integrated with cooperative, reputation-based trust metrics is
able to clear faults more quickly than currently used traditional backup protection
schemes. In fact both sets of tests show that it is statistically correct to say the agent
implementation can clear faults in less than 0.592 seconds and often less than the 0.392
seconds more typical of a zone 2 relay when encountering the tested scenarios.
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4.3.3 Significant Results Regarding Clearing Time and Correct Actions
In six of the nine scenarios, the trust system improved results compared to the
original agent-based system either by reducing clearing time (the original implementation
reverted to traditional mechanisms in Scenarios 3, 4, 7, and 8) or by making improved
decisions (not tripping solely based on receiving instructions to trip as in Scenarios 5 and
9). The most rapid clearing times were associated with the trust implementation that send
additional set equipment messages if an agent dropped below the trust threshold at both
1% and 10% traffic lost. Had an additional rule been added to classify an agent as bad if
their trust dropped below a lower threshold, the times might have been improved for the
alternate scheme where additional agents were sent set equipment messages only if they
were identified as bad. This would have added to the complexity of the rule set and had
the potential to classify agents as bad without any malicious activity having occurred.
4.3.4 Results From Original Agent-Based Protection Scheme with No Trust
The original agent scheme that did not incorporate a trust scheme was used as a
reference point to compare the effectiveness of the different trust implementations versus
what occurred when the original agent system faced these scenarios. In the scenarios
revolving around set equipment messages being lost (Scenarios 3, 4, 7, and 8), the nontrust agent implementation reverted to traditional relay backup mechanisms as seen in
Figure 10. This resulted in the fault being cleared at the pre-established time delay set for
the backup protection (1.5 seconds), reducing the benefits of a communicating agent
system. Additionally, because trusted relationships were assumed, there were incorrect
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Figure 10. Fault clearing times using original scheme without trust mechanism:
Comparison of fault clearing times (with a 99% confidence interval) between
traditional backup protection and the original agent based scheme that did not
incorporate a trust mechanism.
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responses observed in Scenarios 5 and 9. In these instances, as soon as an agent received
a set equipment message from a neighbor, it attempted to trip its breaker immediately
isolating regions of the power grid unnecessarily. As a result, in 22.2% of the scenarios,
there was an incorrect response and in 44.4% of the scenarios the system reverted to
traditional backup protection resulting in non-optimal decisions being made in 66.7% of
the situations.
4.3.5 Results From Trust Implementation 1 (Agent Below Good Threshold)
In contrast, the trust implementations that created an extended net of recipients for
set equipment messages did not revert to the traditional backup protection mode and did
not trip when extraneous trip signals were sent. Specifically, the best implementation
was the one that sent set equipment messages to the next agent in line if an agent that was
supposed to receive a set equipment message fell below the established trust threshold for
good classification. The improved trust scheme was able to better identify fault location
and clear the fault based on the expanded set of information that it was able to obtain and
analyze. By interacting with all agents responsible for protecting the specified segment
of transmission line, an agent was more likely to verify any zone 1 or zone 3 fault signals
that were observed.
By verifying these signals, the agent was able to adapt to malicious behavior and
reduce clearing time as shown in Figure 11. Signal verification was used to cross
reference readings from multiple locations and remote current measurements were used
to prevent creating an isolation zone that was larger than required. These verifications,
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Figure 11. Fault clearing times: set messages extended if below threshold. Fault
clearing times with a 99% confidence interval for agent implementation where
set equipment messages are sent to an extended set of recipients if trust metric
is below established threshold. Scenario 1 – Normal communications through
Scenario 9 – Agent 4 sends false set msgs are listed.
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lengthened the overall time to clear the fault compared to normal communications
situations but the tradeoff in ensuring that breakers did not trip unnecessarily was worth
the delay.
The difference in performance with the original system was obvious especially
when comparing Scenarios 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9. The difference in performance with the
second trust implementation where the set of agents receiving set equipment messages
was only extended when an agent was classified as bad was less noticable. During the
worst case scenario when 10% of message traffic was lost the difference in performance
was limited to being statistically significant only during Scenario 8. Under more normal
operating characteristics (1% of message traffic lost) however, the differences were
noticable under both Scenarios 4 and 8. This tradeoff requiring weighing additional
verification and programming versus fault clearing time must be determined by the user
selecting the implementation and the computing resources they have available.
In Scenarios 2, 4, 6, and 8, trust levels were properly established at lower levels
for the agent that was not responding properly to information queries. In Scenarios 2 and
6, that agent did send a set equipment message when it realized that it was broken
enabling a response time more closely aligned with the time established in the baseline
Scenario 1 where no malicious behavior occurred. In Scenarios 3 and 7, the agent was
trusted but refused to send set equipment messages. The agents were able to compensate,
but clearing time took longer than normal and longer than the time required when the
respective agents were identified by lower trust metrics. In Scenarios 5 and 9, the agents
who knowingly tried to send improper set equipment messages were appropriately
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labeled as malicious, the continued set equipment messages were ignored and actions
were taken accordingly and appropriately when a valid fault signal was received. Faults
were cleared after the appropriate signals were verified as valid using multiple sources.
In other situations where agents were identified as not acting in accords with proper
behavior, the system had the option to label them as malicious when this behavior was
noted, enabling better response actions in the future.
4.3.6 Results From Trust Implementation 2 (Agent Classified as Bad)
In the alternate trust implementation that reduced the occasions where set
equipment messages were sent to an extended net of agent to those when conditions led
to an agent’s classification as bad, results were similar to the previous trust
implementation. It outperformed the original agent-based scheme as well as traditional
backup protection mechanisms as shown in Figure 12. The only occasions when these
extended set equipment messages were sent were during Scenarios 5 and 9. As a result,
the only real statistical difference between this implementation and the previous trust
implementation that had fewer restrictions on extending the set equipment message list
was found from experiments done with Scenarios 4 and 8 where trust was lost and the
agent did not try to let others know that it experienced failure and needed protection help.
4.3.7 Results for Alternate Cases Requiring Blocking a False Signal
The second protection case involving Breaker 5 receiving a false signal to trip
again produced favorable results for the reputation-based agent protection system. When
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Figure 12. Fault clearing times: set messages extended if agent classified as bad. Fault
clearing times with a 99% confidence interval for agent implementation where
set equipment messages are sent to an extended set of recipients if agent is
classified as bad. Scenario 1 ―Normal communications‖ through Scenario 9
―Agent 4 sends false set msgs‖ are listed.
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experiments were run using either of the two trust implementations, the false trip signal
was successfully blocked and power continued to flow. This was a result of ensuring that
agents who were not trusted did not delay protection efforts. Waiting for untrusted agent
information either caused too long of a delay or resulted in an incorrect decision being
made. The non-agent based detection scheme is not prepared for this situation and would
trip a breaker as shown in Figure 13. The original agent scheme that did not incorporate

Figure 13. Original agent system trips breaker due to false signal. Shows false trip signal
sent to Breaker 5 at 0.20 seconds (a). Relay 5 failed to block the false signal
in graph (b) resulting in the breaker tripping and stopping the current flow
seen in graph (c).
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this trust component was unable to successfully react to the situations where information
updates were not sent from a neighboring agent and when the neighboring agent sent
false signals to trip the breaker. In the situation where communications were interrupted,
the breaker tripped as it would in the non-agent system [64] as shown in Figure 13. In
the other situation, the breaker tripped immediately after the agent received the false set
equipment message because it did not verify the lack of a fault condition. The reputation
based cooperative trust scheme met the protection condition established in [64] by
continuing to allow current to flow (as shown in Figure 14) under abnormal
communications conditions and when subjected to malicious agent actions.

Figure 14. Correct blocking of false trip signal with the trust system. When a false trip
signal was sent to Breaker 5 at 0.20 seconds, Agent 5 is rapidly able to block
Breaker 5 from tripping using information from trusted agents to ensure the
current continued to flow.
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4.4 Summary
As discussed in the Chapter II, cyber security measures and improved situational
awareness are going to be essential as the grid undergoes modernization. Malicious
activity is on the rise and hackers have already demonstrated their ability to access the
networks of companies around the world. Because elements of critical infrastructure
provide essential services, they become high-priority targets.
The reputation-based trust mechanism proposed by this research has shown its
effectiveness in reducing fault clearing times compared to traditional protection
mechanisms. These mechanisms need to be prepared to make correct decisions in the
face of potential malicious activity. By comparing fault clearing times, the agent-based
backup protection systems incorporating the trust component are more effective at
providing protection than systems without this component. A summary graph comparing
the results of all experiments performed is included as Figure 15 and Figure 16. The
experiments showed that trust implementations reduced clearing times below 0.5 seconds
under each of the selected scenarios, well below the traditionally established settings of 1
to 2 seconds [24] and [59]. These agent based systems even cleared faults more rapidly
that the 0.3 seconds normally associated with zone 2 relays [24] under normal conditions
and often even when subjected to malicious behavior.
The suggested implementations should be combined with traditional network
security measures and physical security efforts to provide proper defenses. If improperly
applied, this enhanced protection has the potential to disrupt time-critical protection
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Figure 15. Fault clearing time summary at 1% message traffic loss. For traditional relays
fault clearing times were constant, set with a 1.5 second operating time. The
original agent-based scheme significantly reduced the clearing time but in
certain cases reverted to traditional protection methods or operated
incorrectly. The improved agent-based schemes suggested in this research
compensated for malicious behavior and cleared the fault in a shorter time
period without extending the isolation zone at 1% message traffic loss.
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Figure 16. Fault clearing time summary at 10% message traffic loss. For traditional
relays fault clearing times were constant, set with a 1.5 second operating time.
The original agent-based scheme significantly reduced the clearing time but in
certain cases reverted to traditional protection methods or operated
incorrectly. The improved agent-based schemes suggested in this research
compensated for malicious behavior and cleared the fault in a shorter time
period without extending the isolation zone at 10% message traffic loss.
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devices by adding delays where none previously existed. While delays are better than
interrupted or miscommunications in many instances, in the power grid they are
unacceptable. Adding behavioral-based analytic methods for trust metric calculation aids
in ensuring information reliability and improves resulting system stability.
Layering an additional collaborative protection scheme as suggested by this
research, increased the security of the entire control system. This scheme can make use
of existing computing and network resources to provide additional information necessary
for making proper protection decisions and improving the situational awareness of
control operators. Agents used reputation information as a criterion for judging the
trustworthiness of information received during data transactions and will have the ability
to send this additional information to control centers for data analysis. This analysis can
monitor the protection system for signs indicating a faulty agent or possible larger system
attack.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations

T

HIS thesis investigated the proposal that integrating reputation-based cooperative
trust as an additional layer of security for backup protection systems would

improve system performance and awareness. The proposed scheme significantly reduced
the amount of time required to clear faults when backup protection use was necessary and
made a higher percentage of correct decisions compared to the original agent-based
scheme that did not include a trust component. As grid modernization continues and
more intelligent devices are integrated into the SCADA control systems, incorporating
reputation-based trust systems into these devices has the potential to be of great benefit in
improving the reliability, stability, and security of this element of our critical
infrastructure.
This chapter will first summarize results obtained from the multiple experimental
simulations and cover conclusions that can be drawn. Next, it will emphasize why this
research needed to be accomplished and how it will impact and change the power control
community. Finally, it will cover recommendations for future research topics in this area.
5.1 Conclusions of Research
Initial findings from the reputation-based trust integration with agent-based
backup protection are very promising. Even in its simplest implementation, the trust
system has the ability to provide additional information to monitoring or control centers
while adding little overhead and achieving identical performance to systems that did not
implement trust. The additional information captured provides valuable feedback for
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evaluating the state of the system and creating improved awareness of networks and
component behavior.
The potential for a more robust implementation is even greater and has been
demonstrated using the specific scenarios discussed in this research. When faced with
malicious behavior that is not stopped with traditional network protection measures, the
trust system will account for malicious activity determined by behavioral analysis. The
trust system enabled more rapid fault clearing (greater than a 50% improvement) without
increasing the isolated grid area to help prevent outages from cascading. Transmission
line protection must account for malicious activity such as denial of service and rogue
control commands in the future. While a trust-based system will not protect from every
type of attack, it has shown to be effective without adding a lot of communications
overhead. Layering trust mechanisms with other defensive elements will help architects
design more complete grid protection.
5.2 Significance of Research
The incredible power afforded one who is able to affect relay or other switching
device behavior results from the direct control that they possess on critical power
delivery equipment.

These components are located at key junctures that have the

potential to affect multitudes of people. They are designed to break a chain of power
failures and must act responsively and properly. The additional trust layer is invaluable
in limiting the effect an attacker has on this vital equipment.
The Air Force, Department of Defense and other governmental agencies can
benefit from this research that applied reputation-based trust in a unique cooperative
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environment. Power and other utility networks are increasingly the subject of attack [19],
[20], [22], and [56]. Trust systems have the potential to thwart attempts to compromise
these systems. Threats to the power grid and other elements of critical infrastructure are
likely to occur during times of war preparation such as the mobilization and deployment
phases [44].

Interviews and writings in [16] and [31] describe how disruption to

information systems and supporting infrastructure could cause delays and backlogs at key
logistics locations. Other research [63] focused specifically on attack strategies designed
to introduce cascade style effects into the power grid. Improving the reliability and
security of the grid protection elements and the underlying communications networks
will have a direct impact on the ability of the US armed forces to continue to deploy and
rapidly project force where needed anywhere around the globe.
The additional information tracked by the trust system is definitely of benefit in a
layered security infrastructure. Trust metrics provides insight about system behavior that
was not previously captured. As grid modernization progresses, the behavioral-based
analysis that this type of system provides can be similarly implemented in other smart
components that connect corporate and control information systems. Regardless of how
monitoring and control is accomplished in future SCADA systems, network designers
take connectivity information into account and allow control operators to make adaptive
adjustments from both environmental conditions and the trust metrics.
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research
A protection system implementing this additional measure of information
reliability will realize additional benefits as widely distributed intelligent agents work
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together to ensure system stability. Research should continue to develop protection
settings tailored for specific applications for further validation.

The trust-inclusive,

agent-based backup protection system proposed here is a first step towards improving the
robustness of agent-based protection and should be incorporated into future protection
architectures.
This research has the potential to be expanded in a number of directions. In the
future, the first logical step should focus on expanding the decision making capabilities to
include scenarios where more than one agent may be malicious. Additional information
validation methods will need to be incorporated into the system.

The current

implementation focused on cross-referencing power system data with locality data to
clear the fault in a manner that affects the smallest area should be continued. Creating
more complex network topologies will help validate the system’s performance when
faced with a more interconnected grid structure and ensure actions continue to limit the
isolation area. This system has the potential to be incorporated into the electrical grid on
a wider basis. Expanding the trust computations to include additional data validation as
well as its implementation in more decision scenarios will help create a more robust
scheme.
Another step might be to investigate this or an alternate reputation-based trust
scheme implemented in conjunction with a policy-based trust scheme such as
cryptography. When used together, the system could take advantage of additional layers
of security. If the coding is optimized, some of the other distributed aspects of the trust
computations such as increased validation using shared trust cookies as discussed in [32]
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could be integrated. This combined scheme should improve protection without adding
additional network traffic beyond what is required for the cryptographic system. A
digitally signed cryptographic token can then be incorporated allowing for distributed
cookie storage or trust metric calculations. The more robust implementation can permit
additional trust inheritance and global trust value computations while improving message
authentication and decreasing the potential for successful message spoofing.
A final direction that future research could take would be to incorporate a
reputation-based trust system such as this into other smart devices that will be
increasingly used in the next generation grid. Devices will have the potential to be used
in demand reduction schemes and would allow end users to be directly wired into the
central control scheme. In these schemes it would be more desirable that a device
respond appropriately when needed. The time delays associated with cryptographic
encoding have less of an impact on system protection since the real-time requirement is
less stringent.

A trust-based scheme would have the potential to select the most

trustworthy devices in these cases to ensure that proper actions could be directed in a
timely manner to create the appropriate system effects.
5.4 Summary
Information and cyber security are becoming more essential our critical
infrastructure network protection every day. In a recent 60 Minutes interview, the former
US Chief of National Intelligence reported, ―If I were an attacker… I probably would
sack electric power on the U.S. East Coast, maybe the West Coast, and attempt to cause a
cascading effect‖ [1]. Proper relay operation is critical to ensuring that this does not
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occur. Without better communications methods and protection schemes, malicious users
would be able to create effects that could plunge entire regions into darkness and instigate
chaos. Traditional security mechanisms must be augmented by additional measures such
as trust verification that provide adaptive protection capabilities for these components
that provide an essential service to society.
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Appendix A. Experimentation Results By Scenario
Table 6.

Performance statistics for Scenario 1 – no malicious behavior. Approximately
equal performance for all implementations.
Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75.
Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68].
Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score
on top, p value on bottom).
Add to set list if below trust
threshold
1
10

Implementation

No trust scheme

% Traffic Lost
Sample Mean
(s)
Maximum (s)
3rd Quartile (s)
Median (s)
1st Quartile (s)
Minimum (s)
Sample Std Dev
n
Std Error
99.5% Error
99%
Confidence
Interval Low (s)
99%
Confidence
Interval High
(s)
# samples
> 0.392s
Sign Test
Median=0.392s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.392s
# of samples
> 0.592s
Sign Test for
Median 0.592s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.592

1

10

0.188

0.20096

0.18808

0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

0.292
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.03173
25
0.00635
0.01775

0.188

Add to set list only if bad
1

10

0.18544

0.18808

0.18848

0.19
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.00040
25
0.00008
0.00022

0.19
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.176
0.00508
25
0.00102
0.00284

0.19
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.00040
25
0.00008
0.00022

0.19
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.00087
25
0.00017
0.00049

0.18321

0.18786

0.18260

0.18786

0.18799

0.188

0.21871

0.18830

0.18828

0.18830

0.18897

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005
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Table 7.

Performance statistics for Scenario 2 – Agent 5 does not send response
messages. Approximately equal performance for all implementations.
Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75.
Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68].
Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score
on top, p value on bottom).
Add to set list if below trust
threshold
1
10

Implementation

No trust scheme

% Traffic Lost
Sample Mean
(s)
Maximum (s)
3rd Quartile (s)
Median (s)
1st Quartile (s)
Minimum (s)
Sample Std Dev
n
Std Error
99.5% Error
99%
Confidence
Interval Low (s)
99%
Confidence
Interval High
(s)
# samples
> 0.392s
Sign Test
Median=0.392s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.392s
# of samples
> 0.592s
Sign Test for
Median 0.592s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.592

1

10

0.188

0.21904

0.176

0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

0.408
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.06180
25
0.01236
0.03457

0.18800

Add to set list only if bad
1

10

0.17736

0.18808

0.18856

0.176
0.176
0.176
0.176
0.176
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

0.188
0.178
0.176
0.176
0.176
0.00250
25
0.00050
0.00140

0.19
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.00040
25
0.00008
0.00022

0.19
0.19
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.00092
25
0.00018
0.00051

0.18447

0.17600

0.17596

0.18786

0.18805

0.18800

0.25361

0.17600

0.17876

0.18830

0.18907

0

1

0

0

0

0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0
0.005

1
.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005
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Table 8.

Performance statistics for Scenario 3 – Agent 5 will not send set equipment
messages. Trust implementations outperform original agent implementation.
Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75.
Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68].
Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score
on top, p value on bottom).
Add to set list if below trust
threshold
1
10

Implementation

No trust scheme

% Traffic Lost
Sample Mean
(s)
Maximum (s)
3rd Quartile (s)
Median (s)
1st Quartile (s)
Minimum (s)
Sample Std Dev
n
Std Error
99.5% Error
99%
Confidence
Interval Low (s)
99%
Confidence
Interval High
(s)
# samples
> 0.392s
Sign Test
Median=0.392s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.392s
# of samples
> 0.592s
Sign Test for
Median 0.592s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.592

1

10

1.592

1.592

0.3784

1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

1.59200

Add to set list only if bad
1

10

0.33856

0.3784

0.39176

0.382
0.378
0.378
0.378
0.378
0.00100
25
0.00020
0.00056

0.402
0.396
0.39
0.228
0.226
0.07693
25
0.01539
0.04303

0.382
0.378
0.378
0.378
0.378
0.00100
25
0.00020
0.00056

0.402
0.396
0.39
0.388
0.382
0.00601
25
0.00120
0.00336

1.59200

0.37784

0.29553

0.37784

0.38840

1.59200

1.59200

0.37896

0.38159

0.37896

0.39512

25

25

0

10

0

12

1.0

1.0

0.0

0.2122

0.0

0.5

325
unable to
reject

325
unable to
reject

0
0.005

91
.025 - .05

0
0.005

160
unable to
reject

25

25

0

0

0

0

1.0

1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

325
unable to
reject

325
unable to
reject

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005
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Table 9.

Performance statistics for Scenario 4 – Agent 5 will not send information
response or set equipment messages. Trust implementations outperform
original agent implementation.
Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75.
Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68].
Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score
on top, p value on bottom).
Add to set list if below trust
threshold
1
10

Implementation

No trust scheme

% Traffic Lost
Sample Mean
(s)
Maximum (s)
3rd Quartile (s)
Median (s)
1st Quartile (s)
Minimum (s)
Sample Std Dev
n
Std Error
99.5% Error
99%
Confidence
Interval Low (s)
99%
Confidence
Interval High
(s)
# samples
> 0.392s
Sign Test
Median=0.392s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.392s
# of samples
> 0.592s
Sign Test for
Median 0.592s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.592

1

10

1.592

1.592

0.22608

1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

1.59200

Add to set list only if bad
1

10

0.25304

0.38408

0.44888

0.228
0.226
0.226
0.226
0.226
0.00040
25
0.00008
0.00022

0.454
0.228
0.226
0.226
0.226
0.07253
25
0.01451
0.04057

0.394
0.386
0.384
0.382
0.378
0.00363
25
0.00073
0.00203

0.5
0.456
0.448
0.44
0.414
0.01776
25
0.00355
0.00993

1.59200

0.22586

0.21247

0.38205

0.43895

1.59200

1.59200

0.22630

0.29361

0.38611

0.45881

25

25

0

3

1

25

1.0

1.0

0.0

0.0001

0.0

1.0

325
unable to
reject

325
unable to
reject

0
0.005

6
0.005

1
0.005

325
unable to
reject

25

25

0

0

0

0

1.0

1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

325
unable to
reject

325
unable to
reject

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005
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Table 10. Performance statistics for Scenario 5 – Agent 5 sends false set equipment
messages. Trust implementations outperform original agent implementation.
Original implementation tripped without valid fault condition.
Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75.
Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68].
Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score
on top, p value on bottom).
Add to set list if below trust
threshold
1
10

Implementation

No trust scheme

% Traffic Lost
Sample Mean
(s)
Maximum (s)
3rd Quartile (s)
Median (s)
1st Quartile (s)
Minimum (s)
Sample Std Dev
n
Std Error
99.5% Error
99%
Confidence
Interval Low (s)
99%
Confidence
Interval High
(s)
# samples
> 0.392s
Sign Test
Median=0.392s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.392s
# of samples
> 0.592s
Sign Test for
Median 0.592s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.592

1

10

n/a

n/a

0.22608

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
25
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
25
n/a
n/a

n/a

Add to set list only if bad
1

10

0.22864

0.22608

0.23512

0.228
0.226
0.226
0.226
0.226
0.00040
25
0.00008
0.00022

0.284
0.226
0.226
0.226
0.226
0.01156
25
0.00231
0.00647

0.228
0.226
0.226
0.226
0.226
0.00040
25
0.00008
0.00022

0.39
0.226
0.226
0.226
0.226
0.03427
25
0.00685
0.01917

n/a

0.22586

0.22217

0.22586

0.21595

n/a

n/a

0.22630

0.23511

0.22630

0.25429

n/a

n/a

0

0

0

0

n/a

n/a

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

n/a

n/a

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

n/a

n/a

0

0

0

0

n/a

n/a

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

n/a

n/a

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005
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Table 11. Performance statistics for Scenario 6 – Agent 4 does not send response
messages. Approximately equal performance for all implementations.
Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75.
Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68].
Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score
on top, p value on bottom).
Add to set list if below trust
threshold
1
10

Implementation

No trust scheme

% Traffic Lost
Sample Mean
(s)
Maximum (s)
3rd Quartile (s)
Median (s)
1st Quartile (s)
Minimum (s)
Sample Std Dev
n
Std Error
99.5% Error
99%
Confidence
Interval Low (s)
99%
Confidence
Interval High
(s)
# samples
> 0.392s
Sign Test
Median=0.392s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.392s
# of samples
> 0.592s
Sign Test for
Median 0.592s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.592s

1

10

0.19216

0.21624

0.188

0.292
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.02080
25
0.00416
0.01164

0.396
0.246
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.05074
25
0.01015
0.02838

0.18052

Add to set list only if bad
1

10

0.186

0.188

0.18872

0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

0.192
0.19
0.188
0.188
0.176
0.00548
25
0.00110
0.00306

0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

0.19
0.19
0.188
0.188
0.188
0.00098
25
0.00020
0.00055

0.18786

0.18800

0.18294

0.18800

0.18817

0.20380

0.24462

0.18800

0.18906

0.18800

0.18927

0

1

0

0

0

0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0
0.005

1
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0

0

0

0

0

0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005
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Table 12. Performance statistics for Scenario 7 – Agent 4 does not send set equipment
messages. Trust implementations outperform original implementation.
Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75.
Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68].
Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score
on top, p value on bottom).
Add to set list if below trust
threshold
1
10

Implementation

No trust scheme

% Traffic Lost
Sample Mean
(s)
Maximum (s)
3rd Quartile (s)
Median (s)
1st Quartile (s)
Minimum (s)
Sample Std Dev
n
Std Error
99.5% Error
99%
Confidence
Interval Low (s)
99%
Confidence
Interval High
(s)
# samples
> 0.392s
Sign Test
Median=0.392s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.392s
# of samples
> 0.592s
Sign Test for
Median 0.592s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.592

1

10

1.592

1.592

0.3784

1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

1.59200

Add to set list only if bad
1

10

0.342

0.3784

0.38992

0.382
0.378
0.378
0.378
0.378
0.00100
25
0.00020
0.00056

0.4
0.394
0.388
0.288
0.226
0.06811
25
0.01362
0.03810

0.382
0.378
0.378
0.378
0.378
0.00100
25
0.00020
0.00056

0.402
0.394
0.388
0.386
0.378
0.00593
25
0.00119
0.00332

1.59200

0.37784

0.30390

0.37784

0.38660

1.59200

1.59200

0.37896

0.38010

0.37896

0.39324

25

25

0

9

0

9

1.0

1.0

0.0

0.1148

0.0

0.1148

325
unable to
reject

325
unable to
reject

0
0.005

60.5
0.005

0
0.005

97
.025 – 0.05

25

25

0

0

0

0

1.0

1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

325
unable to
reject

325
unable to
reject

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005
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Table 13. Performance statistics for Scenario 8 – Agent 4 does not send response or set
equipment messages.
Trust implementations outperform original
implementation.
Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75.
Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68].
Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score
on top, p value on bottom).
Add to set list if below trust
threshold
1
10

Implementation

No trust scheme

% Traffic Lost
Sample Mean
(s)
Maximum (s)
3rd Quartile (s)
Median (s)
1st Quartile (s)
Minimum (s)
Sample Std Dev
n
Std Error
99.5% Error
99%
Confidence
Interval Low (s)
99%
Confidence
Interval High
(s)
# samples
> 0.392s
Sign Test
Median=0.392s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.392s
# of samples
> 0.592s
Sign Test for
Median 0.592s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.592

1

10

1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
1.592
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

0.238
0.238
0.238
0.238
0.238
0.238
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

1.59200

1.59200

1.59200

Add to set list only if bad
1

10

0.2356
0.24
0.238
0.238
0.238
0.226
0.00500
25
0.00100
0.00280

0.37848
0.38
0.378
0.378
0.378
0.378
0.00087
25
0.00017
0.00049

0.39064
0.408
0.394
0.39
0.386
0.382
0.00610
25
0.00122
0.00341

0.23800

0.23280

0.37799

0.38723

1.59200

0.23800

0.23840

0.37897

0.39405

25

25

0

0

0

11

1.0

1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

.345

325
unable to
reject

325
unable to
reject

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

112.5
unable to
reject

25

25

0

0

0

0

1.0

1.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

325
unable to
reject

325
unable to
reject

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005
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Table 14. Performance statistics for Scenario 9 – Agent 4 sends false set equipment
messages.
Trust implementations outperform original implementation.
Original implementation trips breaker without valid fault conditions.
Trust schemes tracked 100 interactions and the trust threshold was set at .75.
Binomial distributions for Sign Test for Median from [37], [50], and [68].
Statistical table information for Wilcoxon signed-rank test verified from [41].
Interpret Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test results in chart as two items (rank score
on top, p value on bottom).
Add to set list if below trust
threshold
1
10

Implementation

No trust scheme

% Traffic Lost
Sample Mean
(s)
Maximum (s)
3rd Quartile (s)
Median (s)
1st Quartile (s)
Minimum (s)
Sample Std Dev
n
Std Error
99.5% Error
99%
Confidence
Interval Low (s)
99%
Confidence
Interval High
(s)
# samples
> 0.392s
Sign Test
Median=0.392s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.392s
# of samples
> 0.592s
Sign Test for
Median 0.592s
Wilcoxon
Signed Rank
Test
Median=0.592

1

10

n/a

n/a

0.238

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
25
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
25
n/a
n/a

n/a

Add to set list only if bad
1

10

0.23816

0.238

0.24072

0.238
0.238
0.238
0.238
0.238
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

0.296
0.238
0.238
0.238
0.226
0.01299
25
0.00260
0.00726

0.238
0.238
0.238
0.238
0.238
0.00000
25
0.00000
0.00000

0.296
0.238
0.238
0.238
0.238
0.01155
25
0.00231
0.00646

n/a

0.23800

0.23090

0.23800

0.23426

n/a

n/a

0.23800

0.24542

0.23800

0.24718

n/a

n/a

0

0

0

0

n/a

n/a

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

n/a

n/a

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

n/a

n/a

0

0

0

0

n/a

n/a

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

n/a

n/a

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005

0
0.005
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Appendix B. Performance Charts for Data by Scenario

Figure 17. Fault clearing times for Scenario 1, no malicious behavior. Approximately
equal performance for all implementations under normal circumstances.
n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.
Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75.
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Figure 18. Fault clearing times for Scenario 2, Agent 5 sends no response messages.
Approximately equal performance for all agent implementations.
n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.
Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75.
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Figure 19. Fault clearing times for Scenario 3, Agent 5 sends no set equipment messages.
Trust system outperforms original agent implementation.
n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.
Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75.
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Figure 20. Fault clearing times for Scenario 4, Agent 5 sends no response or set
equipment messages.
Trust system outperforms original agent
implementation.
n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.
Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75.
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Figure 21. Fault clearing times for Scenario 5, Agent 5 sends false set equipment
messages. Trust system outperforms original agent implementation. Original
implementation tripped prior without actual fault.
n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.
Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75.
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Figure 22. Fault clearing times for Scenario 6, Agent 4 sends no response messages.
Approximately equal performance for all agent implementations.
n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.
Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75.
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Figure 23. Fault clearing times for Scenario 7, Agent 4 sends no set equipment messages.
Trust system outperforms original agent implementation.
n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.
Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75.
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Figure 24. Fault clearing times for Scenario 8, Agent 4 sends no response or set
equipment messages.
Trust system outperforms the original agent
implementation.
n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.
Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75.
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Figure 25. Fault clearing times for Scenario 9, Agent 4 sends false set equipment
messages. Trust system outperforms original agent implementation. Original
implementation tripped without actual fault.
n/a – signifies original agent scheme with no trust component.
Trust schemes track 100 interactions and trust threshold set at 0.75.
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Appendix C. Agent Action and Trust Calculation Pseudocode
Agent Interaction Pseudocode: This pseudocode guides agent behavior between time
synchronization events. It covers the general events an agent might encounter and how it
adjusts trust metrics for another agent.
Require: PSCAD simulator and agent server and clients to be synchronized in time
Agent/PSCAD information update
Agent obtains local PSCAD power readings (Voltage and Current for 3 phases)
Agent obtains local fault detection results (zone 1 and zone 3 coverage zones)
Agent obtains local equipment status (breaker settings)
Agent action period
Check local response messages as they arrive
Update trust metrics
Check for/verify faults in zone 1, zone 3 and in opposite direction
Trip breaker if fault exists in zone 3 and not cleared by primary agents
Process all stored messages
Respond to all information queries
Process all set equipment requests
If from 1-hop neighbor and fault is verified – trip breaker
If from 2-hop neighbor, fault is verified
If 1-hop neighbor did not clear fault – trip breaker
Ensure data from response messages updates local view of system
Send information queries to approprieate agents
Check/update trust values and cross reference information
If you observe zone 1 fault and verified
Send set equipment to neighbor sharing protection
Resend any necessary set equipment messages for redundancy
Verify success or failure of breaker trips
Block local trips if fault conditions not verified by any trusted agent
Prepare for time resynchronization

Trust Interaction Pseudocode: This pseudocode guides trust structure development and
demonstrates general trust computations
Create a trust history used for quick lookup of trust metrics in the local storage implementation
Create a trust store to track trust cookies for each node
Create a trust cookie for each node to track behavior
Update trust cookie and history each time a query message is sent
Increment query and response queue counters and place correct value in the query queue
Update trust cookie and history each time a response message is received
Place correct value in the response queue
Check contents of response vs observed conditions and override trust metric if necessary
Update trust cookie and history each time a set equipment message is received
Check contents of set equipment message vs conditions and override trust metric if necessary
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